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DESIGN THINKING IMPLEMENTATION FOR INNOVATION:  
AN ORGANIZATION'S JOURNEY TO AMBIDEXTERITY 
ABSTRACT 
Implementing design thinking for innovation (DTI) is seen as a way to balance exploration 
and exploitation, and thus attain an ambidextrous innovation portfolio. Yet, transitioning to 
ambidexterity is challenging, and is often met with inertia. So how can managers implement DTI 
as a path towards ambidextrous innovation? In this article, based on an in-depth longitudinal case 
study of a leading Australian property development firm and drawing on rich primary and 
secondary data collected over four years, we examine how middle managers leveraged DTI to 
respond to inertia generatively, and how this process helped shift the cognitive frame of the 
organization toward ambidexterity. In our case, the middle manager flexibly implemented three 
DTI practices— (1) creative problem-solving, (2) sprint execution, and (3) creative confidence 
—in response to inertia and transition the organization’s cognitive frame from an explorative to 
exploitative, to ultimately an ambidextrous innovation frame. Our argument is that these DTI 
practices trigger three generative mechanisms—frame flexibility, co-optation, and collective 
sensemaking—that underpin the cognitive integration that supported this transition. Drawing on 
these insights, we develop a process framework of how different DT practices and related 
generative mechanisms can be deployed flexibly to adapt to the interim (explorative and 
exploitative) innovation objectives over time. We argue that freezing the innovation frame in 
each phase can trigger a generative response to inertia, which enables the organization to 
transition more radically to an ambidextrous innovation portfolio. We thus contribute to the 
limited design thinking research on the role of cognition in DTI implementation, and more 
generally to innovation management and ambidexterity research on how leveraging DTI to 
achieve an ambidextrous innovation portfolio is an emergent and adaptive process.  
 
Practitioner points 
Organizations seeking to leverage DT as a strategic approach to ambidextrous innovation 
should:  
• Recognize that implementing DT to develop an ambidextrous innovation portfolio is an 
emergent and adaptive process 
• Use DT practices flexibly to negotiate inertia in a generative way when transitioning to 
ambidextrous innovation 
• Acknowledge the central role of middle managers for the effective implementation of DTI. 
• Put in place systems and processes that encourage innovation managers to work toward 
integrating cognitive frames of business unit managers and frontline employees 
• Embed practices that augment the cognitive abilities of frontline employees and business unit 
managers involved with DTI to accelerate the adjustment of an organization’s collective 





DESIGN THINKING IMPLEMENTATION FOR INNOVATION:  
AN ORGANIZATION'S JOURNEY TO AMBIDEXTERITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Design thinking (DT) is the application of design methods and tools to innovation challenges 
(Micheli et al., 2019; Seidel and Fixson, 2013; Verganti, 2008, 2017). Deploying design thinking 
for innovation (DTI) has emerged as a way for organizations to develop a portfolio of product 
and service innovations (Perks, Cooper, and Jones, 2005), innovation strategies (Dell’Era and 
Verganti, 2010), and competitive advantage (Liedtka and Kaplan, 2019). Although implementing 
DTI is often difficult (Ben Mahmoud-Jouini, Fixson, and Boulet, 2019; Hölzle and Rhinow, 
2019; Micheli, Perks, and Beverland, 2018), researchers have acknowledged that DT can help 
organizations overcome cognitive challenges when transitioning to new innovation approaches 
and outcomes (Kolko, 2015; Liedtka, 2015).  
A critical cognitive challenge is the transition to ambidextrous innovation —that is, balancing 
explorative and exploitative innovation while managing competing objectives (He and Wong, 
2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013). Explorative innovation refers to radical advances to enter 
new product-market domains that meet emerging user needs, while exploitative innovation refers 
to incremental improvements in existing product-market efficiency that meet the needs of 
existing users (He and Wong, 2004; Jansen, van den Bosch, and Volberda, 2006; O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2013). However, the simultaneous pursuit of both requires managers to shift their 
organization’s innovation frame—the shared cognitive map or mental model of innovation 
(Kaplan, 2008; Narayanan, Zane, and Kemmerer, 2011)—to one that copes with the competing 
cognitive agenda of ambidexterity (Karhu and Ritala, 2019; Karhu, Ritala, and Viola, 2016). We 
refer to such a cognitive frame as the ambidextrous innovation frame.  
 
 4 
Research has shown that a shift towards an ambidextrous innovation frame is challenging 
(Raish et al., 2009) and often met with inertia (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Kaplan, 2008; 
Randhawa et al., 2021a). As a result, few organizations succeed in achieving explorative and 
exploitative innovation simultaneously (He and Wong, 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996). In 
particular, managers struggle with the “exploratory” side of ambidexterity (O’Connor and Rice, 
2013), given it involves coping with ambiguity and unpredictability (Vedel and Kokshagina, 
2020; Robbins and O’Gorman, 2014). DTI has been conceptualized as a way of balancing 
exploration and exploitation (Martin, 2009) in situations where ambiguity and uncertainty are 
high (Liedtka, 2015) and as a cognitive driver of ambidextrous innovation (Zheng, 2018). Yet, 
there are particular challenges with implementing DT as a path toward ambidexterity (Carlgren, 
Elmquist, and Rauth, 2016; Butler and Roberto, 2018). Against this backdrop, we lack clarity 
about if and how managers can use DTI to help organizations attain an ambidextrous innovation 
portfolio. 
There are three specific gaps in the literature. First, the discussion of DT has mostly focused 
on defining how DT tools work (Liedtka and Ogilvie, 2011; Seidel and Fixson, 2013), with an 
emphasis on the implementation of such tools at the team or project levels (e.g., Ben Mahmoud-
Jouini, Midler, and Silberzahn, 2016; Hölzle and Rhinow, 2019), leaving us with little 
knowledge of the organization-level processes of DTI implementation (Micheli et al., 2019; 
Wrigley, Nusem, and Straker, 2020). As a result, despite notions of the relevance of DT to 
organizational practices (Brown and Martin, 2015; Gruber, de Leon, George, and Thompson, 
2015), we lack insights on how DT can be leveraged for broader organization-level innovation 
outcomes (Elsbach and Stigliani, 2018), particularly ambidextrous innovation (Zheng, 2018). 
Second, existing DT research has focused on the structural rather than cognitive aspects of 
DTI. From a structural perspective, researchers have considered where a DT function should be 
located within an organization (D’Ippolito, 2014), how a design function should be organized 
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(Perks et al., 2005), and what practices could elevate the strategic positioning of design in 
organizations (Micheli et al., 2018). However, there is limited research using a cognitive 
perspective to study the thinking side of design; a few notable exceptions (Cross, 2011) focus on 
how DT tools activate individual cognitive aspects of designers, such as reducing their cognitive 
biases (Liedtka, 2015), enabling them to blend analytical and intuitive thinking (Martin, 2009) or 
draw on “generative sensing” (Dong, Garbuio, and Lovallo, 2016) to inform strategic decision-
making (Garbuio et al., 2015). We know far less about how managers use DTI to shift the 
collective cognitive frames of organizations (e.g., Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012) and reduce inertia 
that may constrain organization-level approaches to ambidextrous innovation (Nagaraj et al., 
2020; Danneels et al., 2018). This is a critical omission because achieving an ambidextrous 
innovation portfolio via DTI calls for a collective cognitive transition. 
Third, the ambidexterity literature has also primarily focused on structural aspects rather than 
cognitive processes. The majority of studies examine structural factors of exploration and 
exploitation, such as how organizations can be designed for ambidexterity (Csaszar, 2013) and 
the extent to which explorative and exploitative activities can be produced by the same 
organization through, for example, distinct organizational units via so-called structural 
ambidexterity (Jansen et al., 2006; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996) or by designing systems and 
processes for their simultaneous pursuit within the same unit via contextual ambidexterity 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Randhawa, Wilden and Gudergan, 2021b) or by organizing 
activities over time in sequential explore-exploit cycles via temporal ambidexterity (Siggelkow 
and Levinthal, 2003). While some studies have identified DT as an antecedent of ambidextrous 
innovation (e.g., Zheng, 2018), others have questioned the capacity of DT to stimulate 
ambidexterity, particularly considering the inertia that impedes organizations in shifting to an 
ambidextrous innovation portfolio (Butler and Roberto, 2018; Nagaraj et al., 2020). 
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To address these gaps, in this study, we ask, how do managers leverage DTI to support their 
organization in its shift to achieve an ambidextrous innovation portfolio? Specifically, we 
examine how middle managers (MM) use DTI to shift the cognitive frames of their organization 
to ultimately attain an ambidextrous innovation portfolio. Drawing on abductive research design 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Langley, 1999) and rich primary and secondary data collected over 
four years, we document the findings of an in-depth longitudinal case study of a leading 
Australian property firm’s journey to ambidexterity.  
In our case, MMs progressively and flexibly implemented three practices of DTI— (1) 
creative problem-solving, (2) sprint execution, and (3) creative confidence (cf. Dell’Era et al., 
2020)—to respond to inertia and negotiate the transition of the organization’s cognitive frame 
from an explorative to exploitative, to ultimately an ambidextrous innovation frame. We theorize 
that these DTI practices trigger three generative mechanisms—frame flexibility, co-optation, and 
collective sensemaking—that underpin the cognitive integration required to support this 
transition. Drawing on our insights, we develop a process framework showing how DTI practices 
can be used flexibly across phases. We contend that freezing the innovation frame in each phase 
can trigger a generative response to inertia. Ultimately, this allows the organization to conceive 
and implement the more radical transition to an ambidextrous innovation portfolio.  
We make four contributions to both DT and innovation management research. First, we 
respond to the calls for more research on DTI implementation from a cognitive process 
perspective (e.g., Micheli et al., 2019; Liedtka, 2015). The process framework we develop shows 
how different DT practices and related generative mechanisms can be deployed flexibly to 
respond to inertia and adapt to the interim (explorative and exploitative) innovation objectives 
over time. Second, our study demonstrates how DT can drive broader organizational outcomes 
(Elsbach and Stigliani, 2018; Micheli et al., 2019)—in our case, ambidextrous innovation. We 
show how DTI can be used in a phased manner for shifting organization-wide cognitive frames 
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toward ambidexterity (e.g., Lin and McDonough, 2014; Beverland et al., 2015). Third, we 
provide a nuanced understanding of the strategic role of MMs in leveraging DT as a process for 
innovation project portfolio management, thereby contributing to innovation management 
research (e.g., Spieth and Lerch, 2014). By being flexible in their use of DT practices, MMs can 
act as a critical conduit between top management, frontline employees, and peers, reconciling 
their varied interests to achieve the collective cognitive (re)framing required to deliver an 
ambidextrous innovation portfolio (Roth, Spieth, and Lange, 2019; Radaelli et al., 2017). Finally, 
we contribute to research on ambidextrous innovation by clarifying that DT can be used as an 
enabler of ambidextrous innovation by helping overcome inertia in transitioning to an 
ambidextrous innovation frame, in settings involving heterogeneous organizational levels 
(Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013). 
In what follows, we provide a background on implementing DT for ambidextrous innovation, 
and the role of MMs, with a particular focus on related cognitive aspects. We then outline our 
research methodology before presenting the empirical findings and a process framework. We 
conclude with a discussion of the key theoretical and managerial implications. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Design thinking implementation for innovation 
DT is seen fundamentally as an exploratory process (Brown, 2009) that helps organizational 
members “think like a designer” (Simon, 1969) to solve “wicked problems” (Buchanan, 1992). 
More recently, DT has emerged as a way to draw on “designerly tools” to drive innovation 
(Seidel and Fixson, 2013; Verganti and Dell’Era, 2014), organizational competitiveness (Liedtka 
and Kaplan, 2019; Martin, 2009), and performance (Gemser, Candi, and van den Ende, 2011) in 
large multinationals as well as small and medium-sized enterprises (Carlgren et al., 2014; 
Micheli et al., 2018). DT can be implemented in various ways: from a process in innovation 
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projects to a set of principles driving organization-level change (Brown and Martin, 2015; 
Gruber et al., 2015). However, its decontextualization from the discipline of design and a largely 
practical focus in deploying DT tools in innovation projects has left the concept of DT 
disconnected from management theories (Kimbell, 2011; Micheli et al., 2020). 
Most DT studies have focused on defining design tools and methods (e.g., Ben Mahmoud-
Jouini et al., 2016; Hölzle and Rhinow, 2019) to generate innovative solutions for problems 
(Brown, 2008; Liedtka and Ogilvie, 2011). Seidel and Fixson (2013) classified DT tools into (1) 
need-finding tools (i.e., ethnographic observations, in-depth contextual interviews, or customer 
journeys to empathize with and understand user needs), (2) idea-generation tools (i.e., 
brainstorming to generate possible solutions to problems), and (3) idea-testing tools (i.e., rapid 
prototyping and experimentation to test ideas on a small scale for desirability, technical 
feasibility, and business viability). These align with Liedtka’s (2014) description of tools across 
the (1) exploration, (2) ideation, and (3) experimentation phases. More recently, Micheli et al. 
(2019) have consolidated ten attributes and eight tools and methods that underpin DT. 
Beyond applying tools and methods, DTI calls for a shift to new mindsets or mental models 
that embrace user-centricity, ambiguity, and risk-taking (Liedtka and Kaplan, 2019; Elsbach and 
Stigliani, 2018; Schweitzer et al., 2016; Groeger and Schweitzer, 2020). This is because DT is 
seen as “user experience-driven” (Liedtka, 2014) in opposition to traditional “user preference–
driven” approaches that focus on “identifying and aggregating knowledge from existing markets 
quantitatively” (Meinel et al., 2020, p. 4). DT also relies on experimenting and testing several 
iterations of a solution thus (re)framing failure as learning. As such, DTI tests existing ways of 
innovating and is often met with skepticism (Butler and Roberto, 2018; Micheli et al., 2018). As 
a result, in practice, integrating DT into project routines is not easy (Björklund et al., 2020; 
Hölzle and Rhinow, 2019).  
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Critical perspectives of DT have cautioned that reassembling designers’ practices that adopt a 
user-centered approach, as opposed to a technology-centered approach to innovation, has not 
always “brought a happy synthesis” (Kimbell, 2011, p. 286). Indeed, researchers have argued 
that “any innovation implies understanding of both technologies and markets” (Verganti, 2011, 
p. 386) and that radical innovation may equally be driven by technology change rather than user-
centeredness. Yet, questions remain about whether DT is “a means of approaching problems or is 
best understood as a professionally derived skillset” that can help non-designers (e.g., managers) 
learn a “designer’s sensibilities” (Micheli et al., 2018, p. 17; Brown, 2008).  
In addition, DTI is often in conflict with existing organizational structures and cultures 
(Csaszar, 2013; Chang et al., 2013) making its implementation resource-demanding and 
challenging (Ben Mahmoud-Jouini et al., 2019). Prior research has explored how DT influences 
innovation by examining where it should be positioned within the organizational structure 
(D’Ippolito, 2014) and how organizational practices can elevate it as a strategic function 
(Micheli et al., 2018). The argument is that the effect of design on firm performance depends on 
whether it is organized top-down–as functional specialism–or as part of new product 
development- or cross-functionally integrated multifunctional teams (Perks et al., 2005; Nagaraj 
et al., 2020), balancing design alongside commercial considerations (Micheli et al., 2018). 
Research taking a cognitive perspective focusing on how DT influences innovation processes 
and outcomes, however, remains sparse. The few exceptions have focused on “design cognition” 
to show how DT tools guide particular ways of knowing (Cross, 2011) and problem-solving 
through expanding problem and solution boundaries (Dorst, 2015). Dong et al. (2016) focused on 
how DT tools help managers develop “generative sensing capabilities” to use abduction in 
strategic decision-making. Relatedly, Martin (2009) argued that, by enabling managers to blend 
analytical and intuitive thinking, DT enables organizations to attain strategic competitive 
advantage. Liedtka (2015) argued that design thinking enables synthetic, dialectical, and 
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abductive strategies. Liedtka and Kaplan (2019) further suggested that DT aids strategy 
development by allowing organizations to perceive opportunities differently. While these studies 
focus on strategy, Liedtka (2015) suggests that DT challenges nine individual-level cognitive 
biases that influence innovation outcomes, and Zheng (2018) argues that DT facilitates 
ambidextrous learning required for innovation, thus cultivating individual ambidexterity among 
managers. Researchers have argued that innovation is related to shifts in organizational cognition 
(Greve and Taylor, 2000; Kaplan, 2008) which is particularly pronounced when organizations 
must balance the contradictory rationalities of ambidextrous innovation (Karhu and Ritala, 2019) 
and manage the ambiguity and uncertainty related to explorative innovation (O’Connor and Rice, 
2013; Robbins and O’Gorman, 2014; Vedel and Kokshagina, 2020).  
Design thinking, ambidextrous innovation, and cognitive frames 
Ambidexterity research offers insights into how organizations balance explorative and 
exploitative innovation (He and Wong, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013) and other related 
competing objectives, such as incremental and radical innovation (Benner and Tushman, 2003), 
exploitative and explorative learning (Kang and Snell, 2009), and explorative and exploitative 
knowledge-sharing (Im and Rai, 2008). Empirical evidence shows that ambidexterity drives sales 
growth (He and Wong, 2004), performance (Lubatkin et al., 2006), and survival (Hill and 
Birkinshaw, 2014) in organizations and business units.  
The ambidexterity literature highlights different perspectives on how ambidextrous innovation 
can be achieved. Researchers have largely focused on the structural separation of exploitative 
and explorative innovation tasks into different organizational units, i.e., structural ambidexterity 
(Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Simsek et al., 2009). However, while structural ambidexterity is 
achieved through a separate unit focused on exploration to shield it from the mainstream 
business that remains focused on exploitation (Smith and Tushman, 2005), and by separating 
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radical and incremental innovation teams (Martini et al., 2015), effective coordination and 
integration between the two remains a challenge (Zimmerman and Birkinshaw, 2016).  
Another approach referred to as temporal ambidexterity suggests oscillating between the 
conflicting activities of exploration and exploitation over time in response to environmental 
needs (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003; Boumgarden et al., 2012). This allows individuals to 
focus on one activity at a time, and yet, integrate knowledge and experience from explorative 
and exploitative phases, thus overcoming a shortcoming of structural ambidexterity. However, 
this temporal separation and vacillation also demand constant changes in systems and processes 
to organize activities in back-and-forth cycles between explorative and exploitative innovation.  
To address these challenges, researchers have begun to focus on the notion of contextual 
ambidexterity, arguing that exploration and exploitation should be integrated within and across 
business units (BUs), and rely on supportive organizational context and processes that 
“encourage individuals and teams to make their own judgments about how to divide their time 
between conflicting demands for alignment and adaptability” (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, p. 
210). While this approach aids the development of the behavioral capacity to simultaneously 
explore and exploit (He and Wong, 2004), it places great strain on employees who must cope 
with conflicting tasks and tends to be more suited to exploitative innovation (Zimmerman and 
Birkinshaw, 2016). More recently, researchers have also highlighted the importance of cognitive 
ambidexterity; that is, contextual ambidexterity at the individual level (Good and Michel, 2013; 
Karhu et al., 2016), acknowledging the role that individual cognitive capacities play in coping 
with the conflicting tasks of exploration and exploitative innovation. 
Research in strategy cognition also suggests that cognitive frames, defined as the shared 
assumptions and understandings or collective mental models that organizations possess (Kaplan, 
2011), play a crucial role in innovation processes and outcomes (Foss and Saebi, 2017; 
Narayanan et al., 2011; Kaplan, 2011). Cognitive frames help manage the uncertainty, 
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ambiguity, and unpredictability that besets explorative innovation (Raisch et al., 2009; O’Connor 
and Rice, 2013), and the innovation paradoxes associated with balancing exploration and 
exploitation (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2010; Smith and Tushman, 2005). Importantly, even 
when a firm has appropriate project portfolio management capabilities, it may not be able to 
deliver anticipated outcomes if cognitive frames are not aligned with innovation opportunities 
(Kaplan, 2008; Randhawa et al., 2021a). Going further, Lin and McDonough (2014) have argued 
that cognition is an antecedent to ambidextrous innovation: cognitive ambidexterity aids firms in 
embracing tensions rather than denying them. Therefore, ambidextrous cognitive frames are 
essential for generating ambidextrous innovation. Yet, while stable cognitive frames develop 
common understandings and coordinated action at the organizational level, the very stability of 
cognitive frames may also lead to inertia that hinders innovation (Danneels et al., 2018; Nagaraj 
et al., 2020). 
Prior research has shown that DT enables ambidextrous innovation by changing individual 
thinking among managers (Zheng, 2018) and reducing team-level cognitive inertia (Nagaraj et 
al., 2020). Yet, we know little about if and how managers can use DTI to shift the collective 
cognitive frames of organizations to achieve an ambidextrous innovation portfolio. While some 
researchers have highlighted the importance of cognition at the individual level (Carlgren, Rauth, 
and Elmquist, 2016; Schweitzer et al., 2016; Liedtka, 2015), we focus on how DT can help 
overcome inertia and shift cognitive frames at an organizational level to ultimately enable an 
ambidextrous innovation portfolio. We thus respond to Lin and McDonough’s (2014) call for 
more empirical studies on the role of cognitive frames in fostering ambidexterity. 
The role of middle managers in ambidextrous innovation 
The literature on ambidexterity draws heavily on the assumption that the top management 
team (TMT) are the key decision-makers who address the exploration-exploitation tensions 
(Zimmermann, Raisch, and Birkinshaw, 2015), and are hence pivotal in “the processing of 
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disparate demands essential to attaining ambidexterity” (Lubatkin et al., 2006, p. 646). This line 
of thinking stems from a traditional view that the senior managers’ role is to define (innovation) 
strategy, while MMs focus on strategy implementation and, only occasionally, get involved with 
strategy formulation (Floyd and Wooldridge 1992, Raes et al. 2011). The structural 
ambidexterity perspective (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), for instance, suggests that creating the 
conditions to engage in both exploitative and explorative activities and behaviors is a senior 
management task, whereas BU managers should focus on executing either exploration or 
exploitation. Yet, strategy and innovation research has highlighted that MMs’ decision-making 
helps shape innovation strategies (Fulop 1991, Burgelman 1994, Reitzig and Sorenson 2013, 
Heyden, Sidhu and Volberda, 2018) and, consequently, whether and how firms explore and 
exploit innovation opportunities (Randhawa, Wilden and Gudergan, 2018). More recently, the 
top-down view of innovation has been challenged, highlighting the importance of MMs for 
selecting and implementing entrepreneurial opportunities (Ren and Guo, 2011; Schubert and 
Tavassoli, 2020) and initiating and implementing strategic change (Tarakci et al. 2018).  
MMs, as the first instance of organizational decision-making, are well placed to initiate and 
create a strategic innovation portfolio (Roth, Spieth and Lange, 2019; Radaelli et al., 2017). 
MMs play a crucial role in innovation portfolio management, defined as the decision-making 
process to evaluate, select and prioritize innovation projects in line with the firm’s long-term 
strategic objectives (Kester et al., 2011; Spieth and Lerch, 2014). MMs who manage innovation 
portfolios are responsible for not only efficiently and effectively allocating scarce resources but 
also for establishing cross-functional collaboration across different managerial levels and 
adapting the innovation portfolio to emergent changes (Kester et al., 2011; Roth, Spieth and 
Lange, 2019). More generally, MMs act as “interpreters and sellers of strategic change at the 
micro-level” (Rouleau, 2005, p. 1413). From an ambidexterity perspective, Mom, van den 
Bosch, and Volberda (2007) showed that a combination of top-down, bottom-up, and horizontal 
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knowledge flows could help synthesize explorative and exploitative innovation. More recent 
studies suggest that MMs play a vital role in bridging between front line employees and the TMT 
to develop innovations (Heyden, Sidhu and Volberda, 2018), leading to calls for more in-depth 
analyses of how MMs contribute to innovation (Radaelli et al., 2017) and shape an ambidextrous 
innovation portfolio in organizations (Mom, Fourné, and Jansen, 2015). In this article, we 
address how MMs leverage DT to serve this end. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
We adopt an in-depth longitudinal case study approach to investigate the process of 
implementing DT for ambidextrous innovation. This approach is well-suited where the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are blurred (Hartley, 2004; Yin, 2003) and 
to analyze “a number of interdependent variables in complex structures” (Dubois and Gadde 
2002, p. 558). Our case features the execution of DTI by the innovation unit, Nest, set up to 
pursue an ambidextrous innovation portfolio at Urban (pseudonyms), a leading Australian 
property development company. The case covers four years (2016–2019) and is complemented 
by an analysis of the firm’s recent history (2008–2019) to understand the context and events 
leading up to the DT implementation process. We follow the journey of the organization from a 
current to a future state in line with the targeted strategic ideal (Hoyte and Greenwood, 2007), 
taking account time and the nature of the process(es) of change, to derive theoretical insights 
(Langley et al., 2013). Specifically, we focus on the dynamics by which ambidextrous innovation 
was pursued through DTI implementation and how the organization responded to inertia in the 
process. 
Research setting 
Urban is a leading, publicly listed Australian property group that owns and manages 
commercial offices, retail centers, and residential and industrial properties both in Australia and 
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internationally. The group has a strong property development capability and one of the largest 
property portfolios in the country. 
The group is led by a CEO, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Head of Strategy, Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), and Head of Culture. Each of its three BUs – office and industrial, 
retail, and residential – has its own Head. Together, these form the TMT of Urban. Reporting to 
the BU Heads are the BU general managers who form Urban’s middle management.  
During the 2008 global financial crisis, Urban’s diversified property portfolio, funded mostly 
via bank loans, created significant issues. It represented a volatile time for Urban’s TMT, MMs, 
employees, and shareholders alike. Indeed, at one point, the company’s share price dropped 80% 
in only six months. Slowly recovering, the firm found itself in a more stable position by 2012, 
which also marked the change in Urban’s leadership and strategic direction, culminating in the 
appointment of a new chief executive officer (CEO) in 2012. 
This study covers a period commencing when Urban began to make deliberate changes to 
improve its strategic innovation portfolio through a time in which the construction industry 
experienced growth but also competitive struggles and culminates when Urban began reaping 
benefits as a result of its growing ambidextrous innovation portfolio. 
Urban was identified as an exemplary case for the investigation of the development of an 
ambidextrous innovation portfolio by two of the authors when they conducted a preliminary 
qualitative study with 21 CEOs and chairs of Boards of leading Australian companies (Leung et 
al., 2016), which included Urban. The study’s aim was to investigate the strategies and practices 
of Boards and executive teams that fostered and hindered innovation. It became clear during 
these preliminary interviews that it was Urban’s ambition to develop an ambidextrous innovation 
portfolio. At the time, Urban had just launched their innovation unit, Nest. In 2017, the CEO 
introduced the researchers to the director of Nest (a MM), who then provided access to other 




The interviews with the CEO and the Board chair as part of the earlier study were the first 
phase of our data gathering. We then developed a collection of publicly accessible information 
on Urban, such as company reports and the property development industry. Other archival data 
included documents not publicly available—for example, internal reports; company documents 
such as memos, meeting minutes, presentations, and emails; project proposals; training and 
workshop materials—which were made available to us by the Nest director. These documents 
outlined critical steps in the setup and development of Nest and its practices. 
Subsequently, two of the authors conducted 31 interviews with key decision-makers at all 
levels, including the TMT (e.g., CEO, CFO, Head of Strategy, Head of Culture), MMs (e.g., the 
director of Nest, BU managers), and frontline employees taking a lead role in the innovation unit 
(called “innovation leads” and “innovation champions” respectively) over a period from 2016 
until early 2020 (see Table 1). We identified these interviewees in collaboration with executives, 
the Nest team and by asking interviewees to introduce us to other relevant members. 
Pseudonyms are assigned to key informants. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, lasted 
between 45 minutes and 2 hours, and were recorded and transcribed. 
After the first three interviews with the Nest director and other members of the team, it 
became clear that DT was to be used as a framework for the setup of Urban’s ambidextrous 
innovation portfolio. We then consulted the DT literature to generate additional questions that 
focused on the circumstances, strategies, and activities, as well as reasons for events, as they 
related to the implementation of DTI by Nest to attain ambidextrous innovation. These questions 
revealed each interviewee’s role and contribution to DTI implementation, examples of 
innovation projects they worked on, how the DT methodology and toolset were applied, 
reflections on key success factors and challenges, and how they responded to the challenges. 
Table 1 shows the primary and secondary data that we collected as part of the study. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
As interviews were retrospective by no more than four years, we did not assume extensive 
retrospective rationalization, misinterpretation, or idealization. However, in this relatively short 
time, respondents may have developed less openness, as their statements could have affected 
their career or ongoing project work. Insights from interviews were hence triangulated with 
information from other meetings as well as concurrent secondary data. Several informants were 
interviewed repeatedly over the course of 4 years to trace how managerial decisions were made 
and how they impacted the DTI implementation activities and outcomes. Interviewing 
informants from different levels and who were involved in different ways and at different times 
with the innovation unit, along with the use of secondary and archival data, helped include 
diverse perspectives and complementary information on the same events (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967), thereby increasing the validity of our findings (Yin, 2003). 
Data analysis 
We adopted an abductive approach to analyze the longitudinal data. The iterative cycles of 
confronting data and theory allowed us to “expand [our] understanding of both theory and 
empirical phenomena” (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p. 555). The goal was to allow new theoretical 
insights to emerge from data collected from multiple sources, analyzed through constant 
comparison, and validated by both extant theories and ongoing data analysis.  
We started with a focus on the ambidexterity literature as our data indicated that Urban saw 
an ambidextrous innovation portfolio as a key goal. We engaged concepts such as structural 
ambidexterity in the data analysis. For example, we coded statements about “separation from 
hierarchy”, “autonomy”, “core team” and divided focus between exploration and exploitation as 
examples of structural separation. As we progressed data collection, we were led to the DT 
literature, especially the three different interpretations of DT practices as identified by Dell’Era 
et al (2020): creative problem-solving, sprint execution, and creative confidence, which helped 
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explain our data on how DT was adopted. For example, originally the Nest team focused on 
using DT tools to understand the needs of the customer and to develop ideas for potential new 
products/services. We coded statements referring to the importance of “customer scan stage” and 
“ideation stage” as creative problem-solving practice, as there is a strong focus on understanding 
the customer needs and ideation in this DT practice (Dell’Era et al 2020). See Figure 1 for a 
detailed coding structure. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
As we continued our analysis, we noted that interviewees reflected upon the cognitive shifts 
they felt and/or observed as a result of engagement with the DT practices, revealing the 
important role of cognitive reframing underpinning the firm’s journey toward ambidextrous 
innovation. We then expanded our conceptual framework by drawing on strategy cognition and 
innovation management research, which has noted the centrality of collective cognitive frames in 
driving innovation portfolios. While this served as a theoretical reference, it allowed us to code 
the data and abstract themes such as frame flexibility, co-optation, and collective sensemaking. 
For example, we coded references such as “thinking outside the box”, “something no-one has 
done before” to the theme of frame flexibility as they demonstrate a cognitive frame that 
accommodated explorative innovations (Raffaelli, Glynn, and Tushman, 2019) (see Figure 1). 
This literature also helped us make sense of the difficulty to shift towards explorative innovation, 
which the data also revealed, by sensitizing us to the concept of inertia (Danneels et al, 2018). 
Based on our abductive analysis and our efforts to match theory and reality (Dubois and Gadde, 
2002), we organized first-level themes into theoretical constructs which we further abstracted 
into aggregate dimensions (see Figure 1). 
Next, in alignment with other process studies (e.g., Langley, 1999), we consolidated the 
narrative history of Urban and Nest. We used key transition periods, when the Nest team 
changed elements of their practice, to delineate three phases of DTI, the drivers and outcomes of 
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these transitions, how the phases related to a progressive shift in cognitive frames, and how 
these, in turn, led to ambidextrous innovation. The phases included feedback loops between old 
and new practices, yet, for analytical reasons, we present the phases in a more linear fashion. 
Finally, we conducted an in-depth analysis of the process and outcomes and looked for 
relationships between key constructs across phases. For each phase, we asked the following 
questions: (1) How did Nest evolve their DT practice during this phase? (2) What triggered the 
transition to the next phase? (3) How did the Nest director, team and other organizational 
members respond during this phase? (4) What were the outcomes and impact of these responses 
on the innovation portfolio? (5) What mechanisms could explain these actions and outcomes? 
We generated memos when analyzing the data and literature in terms of the above questions, and 
continuously matched and contrasted memos to refine our theoretical understanding. 
We validated our interpretations throughout the analysis: on several occasions, we shared 
insights with the Nest team. Progress reports were shared in late-2017 and mid-2018, and two 
informal progress presentations took place in November 2019 and January 2020. These feedback 
sessions allowed us to check our understanding of the key issues and provided additional insights 
that were incorporated into the ongoing rounds of data analysis. The member checks served to 
revise and clarify the findings discussed below (Hirschman, 1986; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
By iteratively enfolding our findings with constructs in existing research to inform the 
ongoing data collection, analysis, and interpretation and validating recurrent patterns in the data, 
we developed our final process framework of how DT enabled ambidextrous innovation (Figure 
2). Tables 2, 3, and 4 outline the core theoretical concepts and how they were empirically 




We theorize how Urban’s innovation director (a MM) used DT practices to support the 
organization toward ambidexterity across three phases (Dell’Era et al., 2020). Importantly, this 
process triggered a progressive shift in the organization’s cognitive frame toward one that 
embraced ambidextrous innovation. Figure 2 presents our process framework to using DT as a 
strategic lever for attaining an ambidextrous innovation portfolio and the way this was enabled 
by the innovation director. Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide illustrative evidence for each phase.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
INSERT TABLES 2, 3, AND 4 HERE 
Developing Urban’s innovation strategy: Incorporating design thinking 
Embedding and formalizing innovation as a core capability in Urban was a key strategy 
launched by Karen when she was appointed as CEO in 2012. This was because “[innovation] 
was sporadic and patchy, and there was no holistic thought to why are we doing this, how are we 
doing it” (CEO, 2017). Karen defined innovation as “change that adds value,” keeping the 
definition broad intentionally “so, that [innovation] can be as far-reaching as process innovation, 
a product innovation, a service innovation. It can be disruptive; it can be incremental” (CEO, 
2016). Accordingly, the focus was on improving existing offerings and also developing radically 
new offerings such as using drone technologies to improve health and safety construction 
practices; using prefabricated construction methods, and developing new business models for 
residential building (build-to-rent) or new services in retail (artificial intelligence-enabled 
customization of products and services). The goal was an ambidextrous innovation portfolio, as 
Karen explained, acknowledging the cognitive shift that this would entail:  
We need to squeeze that [existing] business as hard as we can … and then do 
something completely different … so we’re trying to do two things at once … 
owning the now and owning the future at the same time. They’re quite different 
ways of thinking. So, as an organization, we have to be somewhat ambidextrous 
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… in ‘squeeze the lemon mode’ [and] ‘think of the future mode (emphasis added, 
CEO, 2017). 
In 2013, Rachel was appointed to lead the development of Urban’s innovation portfolio, 
becoming Urban’s first General Manager, Innovation. Rachel was a well-regarded and 
experienced MM in the strategy department, who had worked at Urban for several years. She had 
identified innovation as a critical capability gap across the organization and had raised the need 
to address this gap in conversations with Karen and other senior executives. Rachel also knew 
that the lack of strategic direction was a key barrier to innovation at Urban: 
People knew that we needed to be more innovative; we’d had internal studies that 
said we weren’t doing [innovation] well…. So, everyone was very well-
intentioned but was quite directionless.  
Rachel led the setup of Nest and was appointed its director. She chose DT as the key 
methodology to underpin Nest’s innovation initiatives because she saw “the rigor, the structure, 
the thinking around customer problems” that DT offered as important to formalizing an 
ambidextrous innovation portfolio. Her goal was to balance Urban’s current portfolio of 
exploitative innovation projects, which incrementally extended existing offerings to meet 
existing customer needs to achieve better product-market efficiency, with explorative innovation 
projects to develop new offerings designed for new product-market domains and emerging 
customer needs (Jansen et al., 2006; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013; He and Wong, 2004). 
We found that the innovation director used three different DT practices in phases to respond 
generatively to inertia towards explorative innovation and shift the cognitive frame of the 
organization toward ambidexterity. We present our findings according to our three-phase 
periodization: (1) creative problem-solving, (2) sprint execution and, (3) creative confidence. For 
each phase, we show the firms’ organizational context and the structural separation that marked 
the beginning of each phase, enabling the organization to progressively build resources and 
legitimacy for DTI. We then demonstrate how the implementation of a specific DT practice, 
from creative problem-solving to design sprint execution to creative confidence, triggered a 
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generative response to inertia in each phase through the mechanisms of frame flexibility, co-
optation, and collective sensemaking. We argue that these mechanisms enabled a shift in 
collective cognitive frame towards an ambidextrous frame. Finally, we summarize our findings 
by taking stock of Urbans' ambidextrous innovation portfolio. 
Phase 1: 2015–2017—Creative problem-solving 
The context: Prior to 2015, Urban had no formal structuring for innovation portfolio 
management. Rachel addressed this issue by setting up systems, processes, funding and 
governance to support innovation, and developing specific innovation roles (Faems et al., 2008), 
to help build resources for DTI.  
Structural separation: Nest became the unit dedicated to driving DTI implementation and 
building an explorative and exploitative innovation portfolio. We see this as an important step 
towards structural separation - a proven approach to achieving ambidextrous innovation 
(O’Reilly and Tushman, 2013; Tushman et al., 2010) as it signaled the firm’s commitment to 
innovation, while “protecting” innovation from the pressures of business operations.  
Rachel facilitated a series of workshops with the TMT, including BU Heads, to develop and 
agree on some “broad areas of focus” that set priorities for the company’s innovation efforts. A 
decision was made to define eight missions with a balance between explorative and exploitative 
innovation. Four exploitative missions focused on Urban’s existing customers and product-
market efficiency and four explorative missions were defined around the potential needs of 
future customers and new product-market domains (He and Wong, 2004). This was a deliberate 
strategy to attain ambidexterity by creating a portfolio of projects with different risk profiles and 
time frames and was seen as a way of balancing the long- and short-term (Baghai, Coley, and 
White, 1999). It is well known that such a portfolio management strategy is recommended for its 
aggregate-level focus—bringing focus on the performance of the overall portfolio rather than the 
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success or failure of individual high-risk projects (Sykes and Block, 1989). It was Rachel’s role 
as the MM to implement this strategy (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). 
Rachel recruited 22 volunteers called innovation champions (frontline employees) from 
across the firm, who were trained in DT by a team of external consultants, building resources for 
DT. The champions’ brief was to spend about 2–3 days per month working exclusively on either 
an exploitative or explorative innovation mission and come up with creative ideas to support the 
idea generation phase of the innovation value chain (Hansen and Birkenshaw, 2007). Promising 
ideas were passed onto the respective BUs to be further tested, implemented and 
commercialized.  
We refer to this as the start of structural separation as innovation champions were removed 
from their operational activities and put into dedicated teams working on either an explorative or 
exploitative mission (Martini et al., 2015; Simsek et al., 2009). The teams were organizationally 
interdependent with respect to pursuing ambidexterity and their activities were coordinated 
through a shared vision and the leadership of the Nest director and the senior management team 
(O’ Reilly and Tushman, 2007). Kelley (2009, p. 497) argues that structural options that 
“preserve organizational connectedness [] will more likely be associated with sustainable radical 
innovation activity in an established organization”. Although Nest was as a separate unit, the 
innovation champions provided an ongoing connection to the BUs. 
Creative problem solving: To translate the missions into innovation ideas, Rachel and the 
innovation champions used a creative problem-solving approach (Dell’Era et al., 2020) to “go 
and talk to customers around these [missions] to actually identify specific challenges that [they] 
want to solve…in line with our strategy” Here, DT tools were deployed intensively to seek 
creative solutions to meet both current and emerging user needs: that is, pursue exploitative and 
explorative innovation as part of the innovation portfolio management. An Innovation Council, 
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consisting of the TMT, was responsible for overseeing progress and approving a small yet 
dedicated budget for customer scans, ideation, and experimentation sessions. 
DT’s focus on the holistic needs of customers (current customers for exploit-type projects and 
future customers for explore-type projects) through need-finding (Seidel and Fixson, 2013) was 
seen as the critical starting point: 
Importantly, we’re looking to uncover the gaps in the customer experiences when 
trying to get these jobs done— … if we find the gap between what the customer 
wants and the available solutions—that is where the opportunity is. These are the 
innovations that are highly successful … the gap when someone comes up with 
something new!!! (Nest training materials) 
Frame flexibility: Through intense DTI tool deployment, Rachel emphasized “quality and 
rigor over speed,” which gradually led to a change in cognitive frame towards exploration: 
It took almost a year for us to get out of our own assumption and headspace 
around what we currently do. It’s so hard when you’re in a business to have the 
freedom to do that next thinking, and [the innovation champions] did; they did a 
fantastic scan … came up with this really cool idea, running experiments …. So, it 
was really the first disruptive idea. (Rachel, 2018) 
Frontline project members felt increasingly comfortable deploying DT tools such as 
ethnographic research, user interviews, and observations to explore unmet customer needs and 
identify innovation opportunities. They felt that explorative thinking was encouraged, accepted, 
and supported, and radical ideas were no longer perceived as risky: “Now you can have 
conversations with people and explore things without people fearing that their idea is a bad one 
or that they’re too junior and so it won’t be heard” (Innovation Champion 2, 2017). As 
innovation champion 4 explained, “another reason I’m really passionate about innovation is I 
find it transformed the way I think even in my day job.” 
Phase 1 (see Figure 2) instilled confidence and commitment among frontline members in 
applying DT for exploration in their daily pursuit of innovation (Elsbach and Stigliani, 2018; 
Kelley and Kelley, 2013), which expanded their cognitive frame as evident from this quote:  
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“[The process] really got me thinking about a different way of thinking about my contribution 
to the workplace, to the culture and certainly, there were some really significant … mind shifts, 
paradigm shift thinking that was required which I embraced and I continue to use that, even 
outside of [Nest]. (Innovation Champion 2, 2018) 
As a result of such an explorative innovation frame, frontline employees had an outlook that 
“if you understand the customer, the dollars come rather than just [thinking], I can’t see the 
immediate dollar increase. That’s been a big change” (Rachel, 2018). We find that this was 
enabled by frame flexibility (Raffaelli, Glynn, and Tushman, 2019), defined as the ability to shift 
a contracted cognitive frame to accommodate explorative innovations.  
 A big part of Rachel’s role at the time was keeping the innovation champions “enthused and 
supporting them in any way”. This is because, without these champions, Nest would not have 
had the same impact and penetration into the business: 
Now they talk about customer-centricity, and they know what a scan means … 
you really see differences in the way people talk and the language, which has 
happened from this champion model.…And we really needed that in the early 
days, that influence. (Rachel, 2019) 
This helped to build critical legitimacy for DTI as an enabler of explorative innovation at the 
frontline level. There was also strong support from the TMT, who recognized how Nest’s 
deployment of DT was fostering an explorative innovation frame among frontline members: 
More people have been learning the process that we have adopted for innovation. 
I think people are now seeing the value of creating an environment of ideas and 
not trying to quickly dive into a solution. People are much more aware of that now 
and far more appreciative. So, we have become far more sophisticated in terms of 
our thinking around innovation. (CFO, 2017) 
However, after two years of operation, the BUs remained skeptical about the focus on 
explorative innovation and unconvinced that DTI was producing sufficiently quick and tangible 
innovation outcomes. As this BU manager remarked:  
You can deliver those great ideas, but then it’s the people that are operating the 
assets [] so it’s got to flow through to all of those different roles and aspects of the 
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operational business. So, I’m not sure if that’s really happened yet. It’s still in the 
sort glory and big ideas []. (BU MM 2)  
Inertia: While the creative problem-solving approach helped legitimize DTI as a driver of 
explorative innovation among frontline employees, skepticism remained at the BU level. BU 
managers questioned why the Nest team was spending time and resources to pursue ideas that 
were “very far out there” (BU MM 3, 2018) and did not add value or direct benefits to the BUs. 
We see this as a kind of inertia to change (Danneels et al., 2018), in this case, toward explorative 
innovation at the BU level. As missions were set by the TMT with the Nest team, who then 
worked directly with customers, BU managers felt that the innovation portfolio was not well-
aligned with BUs’ needs. As such, BUs’ substantial investment in the Nest initiative, including 
the time spent by innovation champions, were questioned: 
We were actually funding [one innovation role 50/50]. And talking to some of the 
innovation champions that are in [our BU], I just got this overwhelming sense we 
weren’t actually achieving anything. We were going in circles [and] the business 
was heading in one direction, and [Nest] seemed to be heading in a completely 
different direction. This makes absolutely no sense to me. (BU MM 1, 2017) 
Both the TMT and Nest reflected on the inertia towards explorative innovation at the BU 
level. The Head of Culture noted in 2018: “because [Nest] is working on some of those big long-
term missions [and Urban has] a very transactional culture, so [for] things that are taking more 
than a few months; [the BU managers ask] what’s happening—is there progress?”. Rachel 
added: “They’re working every day in how to exploit their business, [so when] they’re presented 
with something [visionary], they’re just like, ‘Whoa, how does that fit?’” 
 The BUs hesitated to release their employees to work on innovation projects. Without their 
cooperation, Nest lacked the workforce capacity to deploy the resource-intensive DT tools and to 
simultaneously pursue explorative and exploitative innovation. Soon, most innovation 
champions could only commit time in addition to their usual workloads. Rachel acknowledged: 
So even though we had the innovation champions, and they were meant to work 2 
to 3 days a month, they never actually did …. It’s just very hard when you have 
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your reporting manager and deadlines. [People are] always at capacity, and people 
are working on [Nest] outside business hours. 
By the end of 2017, five out of eight missions had stalled. Out of four explorative innovation 
projects, only two progressed to a pilot stage, and both were eventually aborted. Only one 
exploitative innovation project was successfully implemented (see Table 5). Yet, Rachel 
remained confident that “swings and roundabouts” are part of the transition towards an 
ambidextrous innovation portfolio and that experimenting with DT practices was necessary:  
It’s not something you rush, and we’re fine with that because we’d rather spend a 
lot of time and experiment and get it right than launch something that’s wrong 
(Rachel, 2017). 
Indeed, the inertia towards exploration triggered the next DTI phase. We see this as an 
adjustment of DTI implementation. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Phase 2: 2017–2019—Design sprint execution 
The context: Rachel realized that it was crucial to demonstrate quick solutions to the BUs, 
“[and] make what we offer the business better and add more and more value to the business” 
(Rachel, 2018). Rachel thus shifted Nest’s portfolio management to pursue exploitative 
innovation projects via design sprints (Dell’Era et al., 2020). The emphasis was on accelerating 
the development process and reducing market uncertainty by quickly and effectively launching 
new solutions to meet current customer needs (Knapp et al., 2016; Ries, 2011) and, importantly, 
to demonstrate the value of DTI for exploitative innovation to the BUs. To do so, dedicated 
resources were needed: “…we lacked the horsepower to get things going” (Head of Culture, 
2018), as was a clearer structural separation between exploration and exploitation across 
different units (Martini et al., 2015).  
Structural separation: The role of innovation lead was created and four innovation leads were 
appointed full-time to Nest to enable the widespread implementation of design sprints. Structural 
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separation was thus strengthened by setting up a core Nest team to build resources for DTI. Each 
innovation lead was allocated to one BU to support prototyping, reduce risk and deliver 
innovative outcomes for the BUs: “running lots of experiments and having the business be as 
comfortable around experiments” (Rachel, 2018). Innovation leads were paired with a sponsor 
(BU manager) to focus on exploitative innovation. A delegation team comprising three members 
of the TMT (the CEO, CFO, and chief strategy officer) and a rotating group of BU sponsors was 
created whose role was to support innovation project portfolio management. The aim of the 
redesign of the portfolio management model was to involve BU managers in making decisions 
on Nest’s innovation project portfolio and to make them accountable for their progress. 
Design Sprint execution: To execute the design sprints, a limited set of tools that focused on 
brainstorming and prototyping solutions, rather than need-finding (Seidel and Fixson, 2013), was 
deployed in accordance with project-specific requirements. The intent was to learn just enough 
from users to test viable products and deliver improved solutions (Dell’Era et al., 2020). This 
variation followed feedback from BU managers that using the full range of DT tools was overly 
time-consuming and resource-intensive and not supportive of the quick execution they were 
looking to achieve. As one explained, “I need a [Nest]-lite expedited version that picks up the 
key steps, and then I need the full robust [process] completely …. There’s nothing where one 
size fits all” (BU MM 3). In response, depending on the stage of the projects and the needs of the 
BU team they were supporting, the innovation leads applied DT tools in a more selective way: 
I guide [the BU team] by giving them the training they need for each part of the 
project. They come to us with an idea, and we start the experiment phase, and we 
use Lean Startup to go back to scan and uncover the jobs to be done. So, it’s much 
more flexible. (Innovation Lead 1, 2019) 
Using select DT tools reduced the burden on workforce resources. Crucially, the speedy 
design sprint execution meant that implementing DT became more manageable, and outcomes 
were achieved quicker. Consequently, there was a large increase in the number of exploitative 
projects completed (see Table 5) in comparison to the previous phase.  
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Co-optation: From a cognitive perspective, the visible success of design sprints both fed and 
reinforced the previously established exploitative innovation frame among BU managers, 
enhancing their confidence and buy-in to use DT as a legitimate approach for innovation 
(Wrigley, Nusem, and Straker, 2020). Some of those most skeptical at the start began to embrace 
DTI: 
[DTI] is starting to permeate into middle management as well. So that [middle 
management] level, which we’ve always struggled with. We’ve got some really 
great supporters within that group now that we have worked really hard to build 
up. (Innovation Lead 1, 2019) 
Based on strategy cognition literature, we refer to this mechanism of putting the new DTI 
approach at the service of the already legitimized cognitive frame as co-optation (e.g., Danneels 
et al., 2018; Starr and MacMillan, 1990). Indeed, co-optation helped in building legitimacy for 
DTI at the MM level. Importantly, with DTI being applied increasingly at the BU level, Rachel 
was able to leverage the legitimacy of the exploitative frame to obtain the required buy-in to 
continue DT deployment to pursue an ambidextrous innovation portfolio:  
The thing about [Nest] is, you’re always learning, I’ve done lots of [training] 
sessions …and I still go into a workshop, and they come up with some new 
technique that I’ve never seen before…the techniques they teach you and how to 
think about things and not to close your eyes to certain ideas and biases and 
unconscious bias and all that stuff, it’s just good business to know it. (BU MM 1, 
2018) 
Inertia: With flexible DT tool deployment and speedy execution, as the demand for the 
innovation leads to support BU exploitation projects continued to increase, questions were raised 
as to Nest’s own focus on longer-term initiatives and the value these were adding to the BUs. BU 
managers wanted Nest to focus on their immediate, incremental needs: 
The [BU] knows the business better than anyone, so why are we not going in the 
same direction? Because there’s plenty to be done in the right direction [] This 
just is not working – [] because we’re heading in a new direction [] you are kind 
of over here going, no, you need to be doing this. (BU MM4, 2018) 
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This feedback indicated that inertia towards exploration was still an issue at the BU level. 
This posed a risk “because [BUs] are the ones that control where the dollars are spent […]” (BU 
MM 4, 2018). BUs preferred to absorb the Nest team and draw on these resources to drive BU-
specific, exploitative innovations. However, this further jeopardized Nest’s workforce capacity 
to pursue explorative innovation, and developing a balanced ambidextrous innovation portfolio 
remained a challenge. As Rachel explained, “we’re turning business projects around so quickly 
now, but the [explorative] missions have kind of this slow trajectory, and it’s almost become the 
group norm to have it at that slower pace” (Rachel, 2018). Consequently, no new explorative 
innovations were pursued during this phase (see Table 5). The residual inertia towards 
explorative innovation at the BU level and the continued focus on exploitative innovation 
triggered another shift, leading to the third phase of DTI implementation. An emergent portfolio 
strategy evolved as more experience was gained with the flexible deployment of DTI.  
Phase 3: 2019—Creative confidence 
The context: In response to the inertia that was slowing down explorative projects, DT was 
deployed differently to make the organization more confident with the creative processes 
underpinning both explorative and exploitative innovation (Kelley and Kelley, 2013). However, 
it became clear that the two needed to be separated even more to achieve this (Martini et al., 
2015). For Rachel, this created an opportunity for further structural separation. DT 
implementation for exploitative innovation became “business-led and very aligned” with the 
BUs: “So, we’re working, in a very tailored manner with the heads of each of the businesses” 
(Rachel, 2019). The DT for exploration continued to be championed by Nest.  
Structural separation: In this phase, structural separation became more pronounced than in 
the previous two phases through distinct task and role divisions across units; with the BUs 
owning and implementing exploitative innovation, while Nest would spearhead explorative 
innovation, building further resources for DTI. Exploitative innovation was implemented through 
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incremental design sprints by “the businesses [that] set the mission, the challenges, [and] 
resource … and [the Nest team are] the facilitators … what we do is provide the training and 
guidance [on] the [Nest DT] process” (Innovation Lead 2, 2019). For explorative innovation, a 
radical design sprint approach that brought the entire Nest team together for intensive periods to 
work on new (or revisited) explorative missions was introduced.  
Creative confidence: A creative confidence approach was adopted (Dell’Era et al., 2020) with 
DTI tools deployed flexibly—that is, DT tools for need-finding, brainstorming, and prototyping 
were used entirely for explorative projects and selectively for exploitative projects. With 
increased confidence among all levels in using the DT tools, and by using radical and 
incremental design sprints, the time needed to make progress was reduced: “the sprints were just 
revolutionary in terms of our ability to just make stuff happen …. where we are now is just a 
different level” (Rachel, 2019).  
The way explorative projects were defined and executed was changed with Nest engaging all 
key stakeholders—from the TMT to a larger group of BU managers. During April–May 2019, 
the innovation leads worked every day on “bulldozing” explorative innovation: 
It was progression at any cost because … people in the business were saying, 
“you’ve got great value here, and great culture here, but, what have you delivered, 
what ideas have come out?” … it’s all about delivery. So, it was head down and 
get stuff done. (Rachel, 2019) 
Importantly, critical synergy required for ambidexterity was achieved by having innovation 
leads coordinate activities across the separate exploitative and explorative project teams, and 
through the shared vision and leadership of the Nest director and the senior management team 
(O’ Reilly and Tushman, 2007). Eventually, two significant explorative innovations were 
realized (see Table 5), leading to Urban-backed spin-offs, including a venture that developed an 
artificial intelligence-based system for monitoring progress on construction sites, improving 
safety and reducing time and cost for Urban and others in the industry. 
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Collective sensemaking: Throughout the sprints, the Nest team engaged with over 50 
managers and employees across Urban, which was in “contrast … to the early days where we 
would … only occasionally give the business an update” (Rachel, 2019). They also invited all 
BU managers responsible for Nest innovation champions to present the current and planned 
innovation portfolio: “we went through everything, I went through the strategy and the sprints” 
(Rachel, 2019). This ensured that “[the BU managers and TMT] have visibility; they [would] 
have the right to decide which thing we are going to focus on” (Innovation Lead 1, 2019). 
Notably, having innovation leads coordinate across both exploitative and explorative project 
teams led to a synergistic effect between the two. This hybrid model ensured that insights and 
ideas generated during explorative projects were shared with the BUs and helped inform 
exploitative projects. On the other hand, building relationships in the BUs during exploitative 
projects helped the team secure buy-in and support from the BU managers when they were 
working on explorative projects.  
These helped further establish “organizational connectedness” (Kelley, 2009) between the 
innovation unit and the BUs. From a cognitive perspective, it enabled collective sensemaking of 
DTI. Collective sensemaking is seen to occur as “individuals exchange provisional 
understandings and try to agree on consensual interpretations and a course of action” and is 
underpinned by the understanding that “individual interpretive actions feed collective ones” 
(Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012, p. 1232). In our case, the Nest team worked with the BU managers 
(and the TMT) for collective sensemaking of exploitative and explorative innovation (Beverland 
et al., 2015; Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012; Weick, 1995). This led to joint interpretations of the 
innovation portfolio (Dougherty, 1992) and the development of a shared cognitive schema 
(Moussavi and Evans, 1993; Narayanan et al., 2011) around ambidexterity, underpinning the 
cognitive integration required to shift to an ambidextrous innovation frame. This proved critical 
to attain synergy between exploration and exploitation. The resulting ambidextrous innovation 
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frame also helped build further legitimacy for DTI at the BU level with one putting “half a 
million dollars aside to fund innovation projects” (Innovation Lead 1, 2019). The CEO added: 
[It was] a five-year transformation program []. It was a series of decisions along 
the way to get from where we were then to where we are now. And I would say 
that [Nest] …has been a key driver of cultural change in the organization (CEO, 
2018) 
Overcoming inertia: Progressively, as people from across the organization were exposed to 
and recognized the value of DTI, they started applying it in their day-to-day practice: “I’ve found 
the DT training to be an amazing tool not just for the missions, but for everything I do. I look at 
things from a totally different perspective” (BU MM 5, 2018). We argue that the creative 
confidence approach (Dell’Era et al., 2020) ensured support and ways to gain organizational 
connectedness and collective buy-in for DTI across the TMT, MM, and frontline employee 
levels for both explorative and exploitative innovation. Importantly, this approach inspired 
collective sensemaking across the organization (Buehring and Liedtka, 2018; Narayanan et al., 
2011) through the development of a shared ambidextrous innovation frame:  
I think that [Nest] has had very positive cultural impacts within our broader 
business on a number of different fronts but certainly [Urban] as a business is 
looking to be industry leaders, and I think [Nest] has really provided that mindset 
within the business. (BU MM 4, 2018) 
Subsequently, Urban was recognized as one of the most innovative companies nationally and 
had established a portfolio of both explorative and exploitative innovation, as we describe below 
(see also Table 5). The CEO acknowledged that Nest had embedded ambidextrous innovation 
mindset into the organizational culture (company press release 2019, paraphrased), indicating a 
shift in the company’s cognitive frame. Importantly, deploying DT practices flexibly and 
responding generatively to inertia was the key to an evolutionary approach to managing the 
tension between explorative and exploitative innovation (He and Wong, 2004). This was critical 
in achieving synergy between the two to build an ambidextrous innovation portfolio:  
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As we mature, we look at how to pivot the program. I think that’s one of the best 
things about what we do, is that we actually apply our own methodology … And 
we’ve done that throughout the five years; [Nest] has changed a lot. It changes all 
the time. (Rachel, 2019) 
Taking stock of Urban’s ambidextrous innovation portfolio 
By the end of 2019, Nest had built an ambidextrous innovation portfolio: completed over 
sixty business projects (exploitative innovation) and proposed six explorative innovations, two of 
which led to the creation of radical, innovative spin-offs. Importantly, through the flexible and 
continuous use of DT practices, the company attained synergistic effects between explorative 
and exploitative innovation. Additionally, Nest had engaged in over 2500 direct customer 
interactions and raised AU$7.9 million to seed fund Nest projects. The team had trained close to 
25% of Urban’s workforce, including 165 now skilled and experienced innovation champions.  
In 2020, Urban received global recognition for its innovation achievements, ranking in the top 
10 of the world’s most innovative companies in its category. This ranking was based on three 
explorative innovation projects that delivered innovative solutions for commercial, residential, 
and retail customers. Urban’s CEO summarized the emergent, adaptive implementation of DTI 
driven by a generative response when faced with inertia that shifted the cognitive frame across 
the organization: 
Over the last few years, we have been working towards a culture of innovation 
where everybody believes it is part of their job to challenge the status quo and 
reimagine what we do. This transition has been championed by our innovation 
team [Nest] [] We are changing the way we problem solve as a business (CEO, 
2020, company website). 
DISCUSSION 
DT practices for ambidextrous innovation: a framework 
We have presented findings of a longitudinal case study showing how the innovation director 
(MM) of a large organization used DT practices flexibly over three phases and how this process 
helped shift the cognitive frame of the organization toward ambidexterity. This led us to develop 
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a process framework (Figure 2). While the deliberate strategy from the outset was to achieve an 
ambidextrous innovation portfolio, getting there only emerged as a result of a phased and 
adaptive process, ranging from creative problem-solving to design sprints and finally to creative 
confidence. When faced with inertia to explorative innovation, the innovation director (MM) 
responded with strategic flexibility: she adapted the DT approach and structures along the way, 
allowing an emergent portfolio strategy to be shaped over time (Burgelman, 1983; Mintzberg, 
1978). The MM’s generative response to inertia in each phase guided the choice of the type of 
DT that was adopted. The mechanisms of this emergent process were similar across all phases, 
and eventually overcame the inertia and achieved an ambidextrous cognitive frame.  
Each phase began with structural separation (Faems et al., 2008; O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2013; Tushman et al., 2010), that increased progressively in terms of formal structuring of a 
separate organizational unit, team recruitment and training, and role distinction for exploration 
and exploitation. The structural separation helped in building resources for DTI—in turn 
enabling the implementation of a specific DT practice in phases, starting from creative problem-
solving to design sprint execution, and finally creative confidence (Dell’Era et al., 2020). The 
decision to adopt these practices in each phase was triggered by what we term “generative 
inertia”. We argue that the MMs generative response to inertia in each phase triggered the 
cognitive mechanisms—frame flexibility, co-optation, and collective sensemaking—that 
underpinned the transition from an explorative to exploitative to ambidextrous frame. Such a 
continuous and evolutionary development of a shared ambidextrous innovation frame across 
diverse units and organizational levels (Narayanan et al., 2011; Kaplan, 2011) drove the 
cognitive integration necessary to achieve an ambidextrous innovation portfolio.  
During the creative problem-solving phase, need-finding (Seidel and Fixson, 2013) with a 
focus on user-centeredness (Brown, 2008) enabled frame flexibility (Raffaelli et al., 2019), which 
in turn, expanded the exploitative frame to accommodate an explorative innovation frame among 
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frontline employees. This created legitimacy for DTI as a driver of explorative innovation at the 
frontline level. However, inertia at the BU level in relation to explorative innovation generated a 
pivot to design sprint execution in Phase 2. Here, the focus shifted back to exploitative 
innovation via the flexible deployment of brainstorming and prototyping (Seidel and Fixson, 
2013) to accelerate the innovation development process (Knapp et al., 2016; Ries, 2011), which 
enabled co-optation (Starr and MacMillan, 1990; Danneels, Verona and Provera, 2018), 
enhancing legitimacy for DTI as an enabler of exploitative innovation at the BU level. However, 
the residual inertia in relation to exploration triggered a generative response that led the change 
to a creative confidence approach in Phase 3. All DT tools (need-finding, brainstorming, and 
prototyping) were leveraged flexibly for both explorative and exploitative innovation. Critically, 
collective sensemaking (Stigliani and Ravasi, 2012; Beverland et al., 2015) was instrumental in 
cognitive integration across the top, middle, and frontline levels to foster an ambidextrous 
innovation frame (Buehring and Liedtka, 2018), and create synergies between explorative and 
exploitative innovation (He and Wong, 2004).  
This process was shaped as the innovation director (MM) and her team pivoted along the way, 
adjusting responsibilities for exploitation and exploration and how DTI is deployed based on 
feedback. Importantly, while Nest started with a deliberate innovation portfolio strategy, they 
changed it along the way as needed. Moreover, rather than attempting to follow a single best DTI 
approach, they adapted their DT practice and related structure as interim objectives evolved, 
highlighting the significance of strategic flexibility (Burgelman, 1983; Mintzberg, 1978). In light 
of these findings, we suggest that the flexible and phased implementation of DTI ultimately 
promoted a way to achieve the cognitive (re)framing necessary for attaining an ambidextrous 
innovation portfolio. Despite starting with an overly optimistic deliberate strategy and having 
setbacks to DTI adoption along the way, freezing of the cognitive frame in each phase triggered 
a generative response to inertia, enabling the organization to progressively build the resources 
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and legitimacy for DTI. Ultimately, this allowed them to go beyond a local maximum and 
implement the higher-potential cognitive shift to ambidextrous innovation.  
Theoretical implications 
This study makes four key contributions. First, we contribute to the DT literature by 
developing a process model of how MMs can respond to inertia towards exploration and, in 
doing so, shift the organization’s cognitive frame to an ambidextrous innovation orientation. We 
demonstrate how DT can be used flexibly and iteratively, thus enabling a transition to an 
ambidextrous innovation frame. We conceptualize generative inertia as a transition mechanism 
and as a way of coping with the ambiguities and uncertainty of explorative innovation 
(O’Connor and Rice, 2013) and competing innovation priorities (e.g., He and Wong, 2004), that 
ultimately enables the cognitive integration required to achieve synergistic effects between 
explorative and exploitative innovation. 
In contrast to Liedtka (2015), our focus is not on how DT enables individual cognitive bias 
reduction but on how a phased DTI implementation can expand the collective cognitive frames 
from explorative to exploitative to ambidextrous innovation at the organizational level. In doing 
so, we respond to Micheli et al.’s (2019) call to examine how new cognitive frames can be 
introduced in contexts where previously established logics or “cognition-based inertia” may 
stifle innovation (Nagaraj et al., 2020). We also address the need to link DT with innovation 
from a cognitive process perspective (e.g., Beverland et al., 2015; Dong et al., 2016).  
We argue that for organizations to attain an ambidextrous innovation portfolio, it is important 
to have a stepwise approach to DT implementation that can adapt to the interim (explorative and 
exploitative) innovation objectives over time. Notably, in our case, shifting from creative 
problem-solving to design sprint execution, and ultimately to creative confidence, enabled the 
cognitive integration required to achieve an ambidextrous frame. This demonstrates how 
different DT practices can be deployed flexibly and sequentially within the same organization, 
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thus extending the work of Dell’Era et al. (2020). At the same time, our analysis also implies that 
all four DT practices identified by Dell’Era et al. (2020) do not necessarily have to be present for 
successful DTI implementation. Indeed, we did not find evidence for the adoption of the fourth 
DT practice – “innovation of meaning” that enables the identification of “a novel purpose that 
redefines the problems worth addressing” (Dell’Era et al., 2020, p. 10). Instead, we suggest that 
different combinations of practices might work in different contexts and that there is no one best 
DTI implementation approach. Notably, leveraging DTI to achieve an ambidextrous innovation 
portfolio requires a robust feedback mechanism to maintain strategic flexibility rather than 
attempting to get it right at the outset (Burgelman, 1983; Mintzberg, 1978). This is because 
emergent portfolio strategy evolves as more experience is gained along the way, and DT 
implementation needs adjusting as organizational conditions change.  
Furthermore, we suggest the type of DT used in each phase depends on the exploration-
exploitation maturity level of the organization, and an intentional choice to adopt different DT 
practices is required to achieve an ambidextrous innovation frame. Similar to prior research on 
strategy cognition (e.g., Kaplan, 2011) and ambidexterity (e.g., Zimmermann et al., 2015), our 
insights highlight that implementing DTI to develop an ambidextrous innovation portfolio is an 
emergent, adaptive process. Notably, we show how this process can be managed flexibly to 
respond to inertia in a generative way across different organizational levels and BUs (e.g., Ben 
Mahmoud-Jouini et al., 2019). Our findings lend support to the notion that DT is not a linear 
process that can be deployed “through a series of structured steps” (Butler and Roberto, 2018, p. 
49). We demonstrate how DTI is “actually used in multidisciplinary teams that newly adopt a 
design thinking approach” (Seidel and Fixson, 2013, p. 19).  
Our second contribution to the DT literature is to show how DT links to broader 
organizational outcomes. In our case, the phased implementation of DTI helped shift 
organization-wide cognitive frames toward ambidexterity. The majority of the DT literature has 
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focused on specific DT tools and methods to solve problems at the project level (e.g., Ben 
Mahmoud-Jouini et al., 2016; Seidel and Fixson, 2013). Only recent studies have started to 
address how DT implementation relates to organization-level constructs such as organizational 
culture (e.g., Elsbach and Stigliani, 2018), organizational design (Csaszar, 2013), organizational 
strategy (e.g., Knight et al., 2020; Liedtka and Kaplan, 2019), innovation (Verganti, 2006), 
product development (Meinel et al., 2020), and brand ambidexterity (Beverland, Wilner, and 
Micheli, 2015). In line with Beverland et al. (2015), we focus on the generative mechanisms 
through which DT can enable cognitive integration at the organizational level. We show how 
such a process enabled the organization to manage its explorative side and discover a more 
radical transition to ambidexterity (O’Connor and Rice, 2013). More broadly, we argue that a 
firm’s innovation frame can be created and changed through DT if the organization is flexible 
about how it uses DT practices and generative in how it responds to inertia. 
Specifically, we demonstrate how DT can be used to change mindsets in favor of producing 
behaviors that lead to ambidextrous innovation (Lin and McDonough, 2014) by enabling 
managers and employees to feel confident in facing innovation challenges and organizational 
change (Dell’Era et al., 2020). This highlights the relevance of DT for changing organizational 
culture (Elsbach and Stigliani, 2018; Kolko, 2015). More generally, we add to the limited 
research on the process of DTI implementation (e.g., Chang et al., 2013; Carlgren, Elmquist, and 
Rauth, 2016) showing how developing legitimacy is critical (Micheli et al., 2018; Rauth et al., 
2014) to overcome barriers to innovation (Hölzle and Rhinow, 2019; Ben Mahmoud-Jouini et al., 
2019). 
Third, research focusing on the role of MMs in leveraging DT for strategic innovation 
portfolio management is still in its infancy (Knight et al., 2020; Radaelli et al., 2017). Despite the 
strategic importance of MMs in the innovation process (Floyd and Wooldridge 1994, Currie and 
Procter 2005, Heyden et al. 2018), we know little about how a manager’s position within the 
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organization shapes the way DT is used for innovation portfolio management (Taracki et al., 
2018; Behrens, Ernst, and Shepherd, 2014). In this study, we do not focus on senior managers 
(Micheli et al., 2018; Rauth et al., 2014) or frontline project teams (e.g., Hölzle and Rhinow, 
2019). Rather, we studied the role of MMs: that is, managers who do not simply carry out top-
level orders but also have the freedom to make decisions on DTI portfolio management 
(Behrens, Ernst, and Shepherd, 2014). While organizations start with a deliberate innovation 
portfolio strategy, this must be adjusted when faced with inertia (Randhawa et al., 2021a). Here, 
our findings highlight that MMs can respond to inertia with strategic flexibility – adapting the 
DT approach and structures and by allowing strategy to emerge over time (Burgelman, 1983; 
Mintzberg, 1978). This highlights the strategic role and agency of MM in leveraging DT for 
innovation portfolio management.  
In particular, we investigated MMs’ bottom-up engagement with senior executives, their top-
down engagement with frontline employees, and their horizontal engagement with peers in 
leveraging DTI to facilitate innovation portfolio management (Roth, Spieth, and Lange, 2019; 
Kester et al., 2011). In this context, our study demonstrates that MMs act as a conduit between 
TMT, frontline employees, and peers, reconciling their varied interests, increasing legitimacy for 
DT, to ultimately shape the organization’s collective cognitive frames over time, underpinning 
its shift towards ambidextrous innovation. This finding accords with prior management research 
on how MMs contribute to strategy and innovation by championing initiatives such as DTI 
(Glaser, Stam, and Takeuchi, 2016; Heyden, Sidhu, and Volberda, 2018; Huy, 2002). The 
implications of our findings are that focusing only on the upper echelons creates the risk of 
misattributing the consequences of innovation processes, some of which are at least partly 
attributable to MMs (Schubert and Tavassoli 2020). 
Prior research has suggested that MMs manage innovation portfolios by applying formalized 
innovation portfolio management systems, seeking to align their employees’ different abilities, 
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actions, and outcomes with firm goals and strategy (Kester et al., 2011; Spieth and Lerch, 2014; 
Randhawa, Wilden and West, 2019). By contrast, we contribute to the limited research taking a 
behavioral perspective to innovation portfolio management (Radaelli et al., 2017; Roth, Spieth 
and Lange, 2019), showing how MMs can use DTI to respond generatively to inertia and 
facilitate collective sensemaking among various organizational members to align their decisions 
and actions with firm strategies (Randhawa et al, 2021a). We thus complement Roth et al.’s 
(2019) work on the role of sensegiving and sensebreaking in innovation portfolio management. 
We show how using DTI flexibly can help MMs adapt innovation portfolios to changes and 
opportunities, reconcile conflicting interests and understandings among groups (Andriopoulos 
and Lewis, 2010; Smith and Tushman, 2005), and account for the complexity and uncertainty in 
exploratory innovation (Vedel and Kokshagina, 2020; O’Connor and Rice, 2013). In so doing, 
our study challenges the effectiveness of formal and rational but potentially inflexible innovation 
portfolio management processes.  
Our final contribution is to ambidextrous innovation research. By showing how DT practices 
can be deployed in a phased manner to attain an ambidextrous innovation portfolio, we add to 
the limited research that clarifies the relationship between DT implementation and ambidexterity. 
Previous conceptual work has suggested that DT can enable ambidextrous innovation through 
the mediating effect of ambidextrous learning at the project level (Zheng, 2018). We extend this 
work showing how DT can enable ambidextrous innovation through a suite of generative 
mechanisms deployed at the organizational level. We identify how these mechanisms allow for a 
generative response to inertia towards exploration, leading to an ambidextrous innovation frame. 
We highlight the need for starting with the near-term exploitative innovation and build resources 
and legitimacy progressively before attempting to pursue explorative innovation. In doing so, we 
address the more general question of how managers can use DT in a stepwise manner when 
transitioning to ambidextrous innovation. We contend that DT can provide a new organizational 
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design principle to manage the tension between explorative and exploitative innovation 
simultaneously (He and Wong, 2004).  
Research on ambidexterity has stressed the differentiation between structural, temporal and 
contextual ambidexterity (Zimmerman and Birkinshaw, 2016) – and more recently cognitive 
ambidexterity, which refers to contextual ambidexterity at the individual level (e.g., Good and 
Michel, 2013; Karhu et al., 2016). In our study, DT provided a set of practices that enabled 
individuals to address different dualities—exploitation and exploration (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 
2008; see also “harmonic ambidexterity”, Simsek et al., 2009). We suggest that flexible use of 
DT practices can serve as a basis for cooperative exchange to help attain “organizational 
connectedness” (Kelley, 2009), that is critical for the cognitive integration underpinning 
ambidextrous innovation (Simsek et al., 2009; Zimmerman and Birkinshaw, 2016). This is in 
line with He and Wong (2004), who find that ambidexterity can be achieved if the dualities 
between exploration and exploitation can be reconciled by managers at the group level. 
Furthermore, while structural and contextual ambidexterity has often been considered as 
being mutually exclusive, we found that DT can enable a dual approach to ambidexterity 
(Randhawa, Wilden and Gudergan, 2021b). This is because DT tools can be adapted to the needs 
and objectives of the evolving innovation project portfolio and help attain greater connections 
between the innovation unit and the broader organization on which it depends. These ultimately 
develop collective cognitive frames that provide synergistic effects between explorative and 
exploitative innovation, thus supporting the shift to ambidextrous innovation (He and Wong, 
2004). 
In so doing, we also add to the sparse literature on cognitive ambidexterity by showing how 
DT can be used as a lever to help teams develop the cognitive capacity to accommodate the 
contradictions between explorative and exploitative innovation (Good and Michel, 2013) and 
expand their cognitive agenda to recognize a broader range of innovation opportunities (Smith 
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and Tushman, 2005). Eventually, these lead to a collective cognitive reframing toward 
ambidexterity at the organizational level (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013). 
Managerial implications 
Our findings are relevant for executives and managers who leverage DT as a strategic 
approach to innovation. Too often the focus of implementing DT is merely on training people in 
new tools and methods leading to naive expectations of achieving outcomes quickly. Our 
findings suggest that executives must tap into the potential of DT to achieve strategic outcomes 
such as ambidextrous innovation. At the same time, we show that implementing DT in 
transitioning to long-term explorative innovation outcomes and pursuing ambidextrous 
innovation is not straightforward – it is an emergent and adaptive process. We highlight the 
significant role that MMs can play in the flexible implementation of DTI and proactively 
addressing inertia.  
Indeed, our case highlights that for an organization with a high-velocity, operational culture, 
to attempt to secure support for high-risk, long-term explorative innovation, there needs to be a 
step-wise approach. We suggest that organizations will benefit most from DTI when managers 
deploy DTI in a phased manner rather than striving for ambidextrous innovation outcomes from 
the outset. It is best to start with the near-term exploitative innovation and build resources and 
legitimacy progressively before attempting to pursue explorative innovation. In navigating the 
shift to ambidexterity, managers can use our framework to choose DT practices that can be used 
flexibly based on the exploration-exploitation maturity and objectives of their organizations. 
Rather than follow a single best approach, it is best to be pragmatic, and test, adapt and pivot to 
different DT practices as interim objectives evolve. We suggest that such an iterative approach, 
that lies at the heart of DT, applies to the very implementation of DT too.  
Because managers charged with the responsibility to implement innovation, often MMs, are 
often directly exposed to the pressures of delivering on short-term business objectives and long-
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term innovation strategies, they have a challenging but crucial role in achieving ambidextrous 
innovation outcomes. In other words, if organizations want to develop an ambidextrous 
innovation portfolio, they need to appreciate the strategic role and agency of MMs in this 
process. It is hence important to train and coach MMs to use DT practices flexibly to this end. 
MMs responsible for DTI implementation also require autonomy and resources to adjust the DTI 
approach —for example, shifting between the practices of creative problem-solving, sprint 
execution, and creative confidence—to meet changing demands. Giving MMs autonomy means 
giving them the freedom to experiment (and possibly fail) and pivot as they discover new ways 
of working with new approaches in the prevailing work culture. 
Our findings suggest that MMs can leverage DTI practices to trigger generative 
mechanisms—frame flexibility, co-optation, and collective sensemaking – to adapt to the interim 
(explorative and exploitative) innovation objectives over time. First, we find that implementing 
creative problem-solving triggers frame flexibility by expanding cognitive frames to 
accommodate explorative innovation. Here, dedicated training of managers and employees in 
creative problem-solving techniques could also play a crucial role. Second, sprint execution can 
be used to achieve cognitive cooptation as it can draw on the already legitimized exploitative 
frame to produce quick wins and obtain further buy-in for the change effort. By work 
collaboratively with peers and demonstrating early achievements, MMs can gain their support. 
Finally, the creative confidence approach cultivates collective sense-making by involving 
multiple stakeholders, seeking their feedback and input, and getting their commitment early in 
the process. Overall, this helps MMs drive the higher-potential cognitive shift to ambidextrous 
innovation.  
To this end, firms should put in place systems and practices that encourage MMs to use DTI 
flexibly to work toward greater connections between the innovation unit and the broader 
organization on which it depends, and changing the cognitive frames or outlooks of BU 
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managers and frontline employees across units. This is necessary to create synergies between 
explorative and exploitative innovation across units and levels, and to produce behaviors that 
lead to ambidextrous innovation. Employees and managers need support to augment such 
cognitive abilities involved with DTI, which may also involve developing a mentorship and 
coaching framework.  
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Inevitably, our study has limitations, which also provide avenues for future research. First, we 
have focused on a single organization in the property development sector that has a volatile 
history of entrepreneurial activity (Bailey, 2020). While recognizing the limitations of a single 
case study for statistical generalizability (Yin, 2003), we suggest that our findings may be 
transferable across organizations facing challenges in transitioning to ambidexterity and/or DTI 
implementation. Researchers can explore how the DTI implementation process varies across 
organizations in different industries (e.g., manufacturing, services) and sectors (including public 
and non-profit contexts) that are known to face innovation barriers in pursuing different 
organizational outcomes (e.g., open innovation, digital transformation) (e.g., Randhawa, Wilden 
and Gudergan, 2018; Randhawa, Wilden and West, 2019).  
Additionally, our research draws from a larger corporate organization. Consequently, DTI 
implementation in different-sized organizations (e.g., small and medium-sized enterprises or 
start-ups) warrants further attention. Future research may also fruitfully explore the conditions 
under which organizations use the DT practice that Dell’Era et al. (2020) term, “innovation of 
meaning,” and see if perhaps firms need to be more mature in their ambidexterity journey to use 
this type of DT. While our focus has been on the role of cognition in DTI implementation, future 
research can explore the impact of organizational culture (and other environmental factors) on 
how DTI is implemented. Finally, future studies can explore a multilevel conceptualization to 
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enable a deeper understanding of the link between cognitive frames and DTI implementation and 
outcomes at different levels (e.g., Lin and McDonough, 2014). Despite these limitations, our 
study provides valuable insights for both scholars and practitioners on how DT can be used as an 
enabler of ambidextrous innovation. 
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Table 1: Data inventory table (interviews and secondary data) 




pages Primary data source (Interviewees) 




# of pages per 
transcript 
Company Annual Reports 2009 to 2019 Report 10 ~772 Top Management Team (TMT)    
Press releases, media coverage, blog posts 
and media mentions 
Text 5 18 CEO  
(Pseudonym: Karen) 
2 2017, 2018 20, 13 
Client/partner briefing and industry 
conference presentations 
Presentation 29* 266 Chair of Board 1 2017 21 
Strategy documents (acceleration, 
partnerships, spin off, governance review) 
Presentation 5 199 CFO 1 2017 12 
Consulting firm reports and strategic 
recommendations 
Report 2 207 Head of Strategy 2 2017, 2018 19, 22 
Board papers and presentations Presentation 2 10 Head of Culture 1 2018 23 
Leadership status updates Presentation 8 185 Middle Managers (MM)    
Innovation Council status updates Presentation 15 294 Innovation Director  
(Pseudonym: Rachel) 
8 3/2017, 6/2017, 5/2018, 7/2018, 
4/2019, 11/2019, 12/2019; 2/2021 
34, 18, 25, 42, 
27, 16, 38, 17 
BU briefing, HR dept, Tax dept and other 
functional areas or locations 
Presentation 17* 299 Company secretary/Head of Urban 
internal investment fund 
1 2018 15 
Mission overview documents for Innovation 
champions 
Report 8 8 Business Unit manager 1 1 2017 16 
Electronic pasteboards, posters, digital 
screens, intranet posts 
Text 37* 84 Business Unit manager 2 1 2018 23 
Innovation champion recruitment, role 
descriptions and briefing documents 
Text 12 15 Business Unit manager 3 1 2018 11 
Nest training materials Presentation 10 377 Business Unit manager 4 1 2018 30 
Nest process guide and toolkit Report 2 305 Business Unit manager 5 1 2018 19 
Personal email exchanges with researchers Text 22 29 Frontline employees    
Photographs of events, workshops, trainings Images 12 57 Innovation lead 1 2 2017, 2019 20, 18 
    Innovation lead 2 1 2017 20 
    Innovation lead 3 2 2017, 2019 13, 27 
    Innovation lead 4 1 2017 20 
    Innovation champion 2 1 2017 9 
    Innovation champion 4 1 2017 15 
    Innovation champion 1 1 2017 17 
    Innovation champion 3 1 2017 20 
Total # pages   3133  31  640 
* These documents contain information that was used for multiple purposes and is at times repetitive and/or an amended copy of an earlier version. 
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Table 2: Evidence for key constructs Phase 1 




“[Nest] deliberately sits outside the normal hierarchy of management. Because innovative ideas are all well and good but when a project gets under 
pressure, the [BU] manager is going to stop it [] and the idea [] won't get any airtime because it costs. So, we set up a budget and a very small team.” 
(CEO, 2016) 
“And one of the key tenants of [Nest] is that it’s separate to the hierarchy; its governance is set up entirely separately because we learnt that that was 
best practice, that the hierarchy can block innovation.” (Nest director, 2017) 
“[Need to] [m]aintain a separation between the [Nest] innovation program and the conventional business hierarchy, ensuring autonomy and 
independence” (Nest TMT presentation, 2017) 
“we give [innovation champions] space and training and time to go ahead and think of innovative ideas around these very specific missions” (CEO, 
2016) 
“When we were champions [] we could put our preferences, which one [mission] we wanted to go on” (Nest director, 2017) 
Building resources 
for DTI 
“Then we trained what we call [Nest] champions; so I actually think of them as little revolutionaries in the business in how to think about this 
methodology” (CEO, 2016) 
“[Nest team has] been training people and spreading the story and allowing people to be involved [] freeing up their time” (CFO 2017) 
 “Innovation champions: Building capability in our business; []: Working 2-3 days a month on innovation; In a space that was completely different to 
the normal business environment” (Nest presentation to TMT, 2017) 
“We have ‘innovation champions’ because we really want to embed change at the front line. There’s no innovation team sitting off to the side, it’s 
something that’s very, very embedded.” (Nest director interview for a magazine, 2017) 
Creative problem 
solving (Focus on 
need finding) 
“There is so much value in just stepping back and listening to what your customers want and observing how they actually use our physical spaces []; 
there are so many challenges in terms of how technology has changed the way consumers operate.” (BU manager 1, 2017) 
“We've also learned that actually going out and talking to people is absolutely essential. You can't sit in a room and you can't ask people what they 
would do. You have to go and ask people what they do do.” (CEO, 2016) 
“[Nest] was [b]ased on leading Design thinking methodologies; [and] a customer-centric approach.” (Nest progress presentation to TMT, 2017) 
“The customer is everything – customers are at the heart of innovation and our innovation process. Our innovation champion training is called 
‘customer-centric innovation’. We’re building the capability in-house so we can be out there, on the front line: interacting, observing, talking to our 
customers, understanding what it is they’re trying to get done, and understanding their frustrations, their workarounds, their experiences. So it all 
begins and ends with the customer and customer experience” (Nest director interview for a magazine, 2017). 
Creative problem 
solving (Intense DTI 
tool deployment) 
“[In] a lot of [innovation] programs, people go from ideation to implementation but there are a lot more stages that you need to go through in that. 
So, we've got this quite rigorous process.” (CEO, 2017) 
“We proposed that [rigorous DT] approach. So, by comparison, other innovation managers that I used to work with, communicate with, [] they 
would skip the entire design thinking process and quickly get something out []; and so because the leadership let us do what was being proposed 
without standing in the way, that’s kind of what set us apart” (Nest director, 2017) 
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Key constructs Example quotes 
“What I really appreciate about working through the [Nest] program is no one’s making knee jerk reactions at anything, it’s all very methodical and 
very thought through. [] So, the one thing I can say about the [Nest] methodology is it’s incredibly robust” (Innovation champion 1, 2017) 
“A process that can be applied to any problem; A process that we are slightly obsessed with; [] it changes the way you look at things; and ensure you 
don’t skip steps.” (Nest training notes, 2017) 
Cognitive frame 
flexibility 
“We had never been customer centric in our innovation before, we’d always been tech lead or saw someone else doing something cool.” (Nest 
director, 2017) 
“I refer to it as a way of thinking and I think it’s an innovative way of thinking [] I see something there and think, ‘I’m going to ask the question’. 
Sometimes you can change it, sometimes you can’t, that’s fine, but let’s at least explore that” (Innovation champion 2, 2017). 
“[DT] really gets you to reach for the stars and think outside the box and reimagine, and for me has been a key driver for how I think and the 
decisions I make on our projects. So [] it gives you a really broad scope – something that’s a first – something no-one has done before and I see that 
as part of innovation [] that’s been the biggest game changer for me in how we think about it.” (BU manager 1, 2017). 
“[DT is] so relevant for [Urban], the methodology is so robust [] just this whole process of starting to question assumptions and to test assumptions 
and not just be led blindly by assumptions that we all make [] is so powerful” (Innovation champion 1, 2017). 
Explorative 
innovation frame 
“We really love the quote of, ‘if you're not changing at the same pace as the world outside you, the question is not if you will die, but when’. \ then 
how are we doing something completely different out here?” (CEO, 2016) 
“We’re not looking to just tinker around the edges. That’s not what we’re here to do. The business does that. We’re here to radically revolutionize 
[][the mission] is absolutely meant to be disruptive so it’s an exploratory focused mission [] A big emotive language about creating a new offering, 
focused, fairly and squarely on our future customer in this space.” (Nest director, 2017) 
“My understanding of Urban’s Innovation Strategy is to [pursue] those sorts of bigger blue-sky innovations as well, which might provide some value 
whether commercially or making our jobs more efficient in other areas of the business.” (Innovation champion 2, 2017) 
“We’re not focusing on just what’s in front of us here. We’ve obviously got to do that as part of our day to day, but we’ve got to be thinking about 
what’s beyond that and I think our innovation program helps us do that.” (Head of Strategy, 2017) 
“We need to be EXPLORING the future, at the same time that we EXPLOIT what we do now” (Nest presentation to innovation champions, 2016) 
Building legitimacy 
for DTI at frontline 
level 
“I think people are now seeing the value of creating an environment of ideas and not trying to quickly dive to a solution. People are much more 
aware of that now and far more appreciative [] we have become far more sophisticated in terms of our thinking around innovation.” (CFO, 2017) 
“[Nest has] given people on the ground some ownership over the process and you see them applying it, you hear people talking about innovation not 
just as a buzz word but as a practice and as a way of thinking and the cultural impact of being in a [Nest] program is starting to spread its way 
through. So [] when I hear people saying, “what do my customers say about this product and service” rather than, “I think this”, that’s when I know 
that the ethos of the program has leaked it's way in.” (Innovation lead 1, 2017). 
“[The DT language] started to be added to the lexicon, like you’d hear jobs being done, and that’s not just from [innovation] champions, but it’s also 
people that have gone out and had some training on interviews and had gone out to do that” (Innovation lead 3, 2017). 
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Table 3: Evidence for key constructs Phase 2 






“There started to be a bit of tension between the [Nest] champion role and the business as usual activities [] So [the Nest director] restructured [Nest] 
to include a core team of people 100% dedicated to doing innovation whatever that may be []. Our role is to do the two things: [] run the missions 
and guide the champions []. But also to give the business units ownership; [] a lead innovator is different to a champion because it’s a full time role, 
focussed 100% on delivering disruptive ends and incremental innovation” (Innovation lead 1, 2018) 
“We have done a pivot with setting up a [Nest] core team [] because we lacked horse power to get things going []. The [Nest] team is on a journey 
around how they play the role of what I call incredible activists – they have credibility in the system – they know the system but they have a point of 
view and [] drive the innovation agenda.” (Head of Culture, 2017) 
“I [] see benefit in having a fulltime team of people who can start to build-up that [DT] experience and that knowledge and share those learnings. It 
was [] hard for the champions to switch from their day-to-day [work] back into [Nest] and back out again” (Nest director, 2017) 
“The success of the [Nest] program, has resulted in a dedicated full-time innovation team to support progress on [explorative projects], and help the 
business apply the [Nest] process to various business projects. [] The team has expert knowledge in best-practice innovation and works closely with 
the entire [Urban] business.” (Urban website) 
Building resources 
for DTI 
“Since the core team has been formed, we’ve made leaps and bounds. [] I think it remains to be seen, on that front, whether or not [Nest] is a success. 
But certainly, in terms of shaping culture and changing the conversation and the tone, definitely.” (Nest director, 2018) 
“[The innovation] lead role has [] in a very short space of time [] increased the internal capability when it comes to innovation.” (Innovation lead 1, 
2017) 
“[The innovation lead role] allows the progression; So, what this [role] has done now has enabled me to just get things progressing.” (Innovation lead 
2, 2017) 
“[Nest] CORE TEAM: 4 Lead Innovators; ‘A dedicated innovation resource for Mirvac’. [They bring]: Innovation Training, Team Coaching, 





“Before we invest the money into developing that [idea], let’s do the scans, let’s do some experiments, let’s just [] use that methodology, that 
innovation, real innovation [DT] theory. [] that’s where we might save thousands and thousands of dollars [].” (BU manager 5, 2018) 
“The centre manager [] developed a little co-working space on a casual leasing site in the shopping centre. [] ... that was just having a go, just trying 
something. [] It was pretty raw in its development, but that was encouraged. Why not? To see what we can learn from it.” (BU manager 4, 2018) 
“We learnt so much getting to that point in how to do innovation properly – how to ask those questions and experiment and rapid prototyping and all 
those things that we theorised about the team was live doing it [].” (Head of Culture, 2017) 
“What happens in lean start up? Traditional approach thrown out window; Customer research informs a problem; Ideas are suggested to solve 
problem; If assumption is validated another experiment is run.” (Nest presentation to TMT, 2017) 
Sprint execution 
(Flexible DTI tool 
deployment and 
“When we experiment, [] we think about how we can do [DT] differently – does it need to be all encompassing? Are there quicker ways to test? [] 
and there’s – almost subservience to the model – like it was some kind of religious experience. Now [] we will borrow from different approaches and 
[Nest] are building their own approach.” (Head of Culture, 2017) 
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Key constructs Example quotes 
Speedy DTI 
execution) 
“[The DT] process is great, [but] it does not apply to everything; there was a period [when] everything we wanted to do [was] to go through this 
process. And I was like, ‘you guys, this applies in certain cases, it can’t apply [to] everything’.[] ‘You’ve got to come up [with] a [Nest] lite version 
[] to achieve outcomes faster.” (BU manager 4, 2018) 
“[W]ith a business project, we might be like, okay, we’ll just do an ideation for you or we’ll just run an experiment for you. [] we pick parts of the 
process that are suitable to that business project.” (Nest director, 2018) 
“We are changing the game. Setting a new pace for Mission progress. We will drive speed and cycle through the learning loop. Rapid learning. 
Imagine we are a start up! Time is of the essence. ‘Whatever it takes!’” (Nest presentation, 2018) 
Cognitive co-optation “But now we want to add value in more ad hoc way, someone can come to us with a problem here and maybe we can help a little bit there or, have 
you done customer scan here, have you done this? So, it’s trying to find that balance between not completely compromising what you do and your 
process and the rigour but also adding value to that business in a way that, they see as adding value as well.” (Nest director, 2017) 
“[Nest] is good to have as a consulting role; so say we had a proposal on a project to implement something new that would be an industry first, it 
would be good to be able to go to [Nest] and consult them on that idea and see what their thoughts were [] because it does add cost and often these 
projects – they are done on a very lean basis.” (Innovation lead 3, 2018) 
“The sprints were designed to get that outcome for the business, which they did and so we had at least one idea from every mission that entered the 
market or was delivered to the business. [] we have got [four successful projects] out.” (Innovation lead 1, 2019)  
Exploitative 
innovation frame 
“[BU managers] don’t necessarily want to come to [Nest] and give [us] something because [they] won’t get anything out of it for two years []; [they 
were] feeling like the innovation process was too intense or too long.” (Innovation lead 2, 2017). 
“I was having monthly catch-ups with whoever the innovation lead was, and making sure that we were progressing things, that I was asking 
questions. What are we putting in front of people? What are we focusing on? Just putting that business lens over it. So, I think, you need to have the 
innovation mindset and the thinking and pushing that, but it’s got to be connected to the business.” (BU manager 4, 2018) 
“It might not be things that develop into the next amazing thing that changes the world, but if it’s that incremental change at project level and if you 
have lots and lots of people across the business doing that, then that in aggregate creates a lot of value.” (Head of Strategy, 2017) 
Building legitimacy 
for DTI at MM level 
“[We have] really spent those nine months focused on the ripple effect, as in, business projects – deliver value to the business, show how design 
thinking can be rolled out and help with someone in any way, shape, or form [] – and I think we’ve built a lot of political capital back with the 
businesses and demonstrated [the] value [of DT] and so we’re in a much better place now than we were [before].” (Nest director, 2019) 
“The ability to articulate the alignment of how [Nest projects] were actually tied to the strategy [] started to happen.” (BU manager 4, 2018) 
“Some of the senior people from the [BU] were also training in [DT] research, and my [] manager was at that training, and she was quite excited 
about the opportunity to [] bring some of that into projects.” (Innovation champion 1, 2017) 
“Sprints [] delivered things that we could put in the market as tangible outcomes for the business. They were hugely valuable to the business in terms 
of the PR and the brand recognition they were getting.” (Innovation lead 1, 2019) 
“[Nest projects are] focused on extending the reach of the [Nest] ideology from [Nest] Missions to BAU [business as usual]; Become more 
embedded []; move from compartmentalised program to a group wide customer-centric ideology; 1. Where [Nest] ideology applied to BAU by both 
champions and non-champions; 2. Commercialisation and implementation of ideas” (Nest progress presentation to TMT, 2017) 
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Table 4: Evidence for key constructs Phase 3 
Key constructs Example quotes 
Structural separation 
(DTI task division 
across units) 
“The businesses tend to focus on incremental [innovation]. At [Nest] we are very conscious of [pursuing explore ideas].” (Innovation lead 3, 2019) 
“So, we’ve got the [Nest] mission. And then there’s [the BUs projects] which we see as more incremental [] And we run [our mission] like a sprint, but 
we bring our fulltime team. [] The switch [between exploration and exploitation] comes from our role in the business []. So, when we’re helping with 
the business projects, we approach it as a consultant would [].” (Nest director, 2019) 
Building resources 
for DTI 
“We’ve still got the champions, but we’re bigger than that now. So, we just trained 65 champions again. [] But we don’t get just champions on 
business projects. It’s anyone.” (Nest director, 2019) 
“I train and I provide the skills to the people within the team, and then I mentor them through that process as well.” (Innovation lead 1, 2019). 
“We’ll train them [people in the BUs who don’t know the DT methodology]. [] with business projects, [training] tends to be staged. They don’t 
normally go straight from scan to experiment in six weeks like we might do on a mission; [] so you can train them on just scan or just lean experiment 
so that you can chunk it up.” (Innovation lead 3, 2019) 
“What is a Champion? Literally champion innovation in the organisation. Keep innovation top of mind. Share the methodology with your colleagues. 
Agile champion model. Unlimited number of champions. [Nest] accredited.” (Nest innovation champion training notes, 2019) 
Creative confidence 




“I worked on a project where they [the BU] already had an idea and in that particular instance, normally I would say, ‘look, why don’t we go and 
experiment with some of this’; but in that particular instance I said, ‘oh, look, we –it would be worthwhile to go back and do a bit of a scan’, because [] 
having gone straight to solution probably wasn’t the best thing to do, and they recognised that themselves.” (Innovation lead 3, 2019) 
“Once we set the mission, we knew it was about [this customer group], we then went and completed a scan [] and out of that came a lot of themes, so 
common themes and challenges []. So out of that research we then took challenges into [] an ideation. [] we had 200 people go through and we invited 
externals as well to go through and come up with ideas to solve the challenges, then we went through our decide phase []. [A]nd then we started to 
experiment with that [].” (Innovation lead 3, 2019) 
“The SHIFT to a [Nest] way of thinking is to change the way you think about your customer. [] When we understand the job the customer is trying to 
get done – we understand the opportunity for innovation.” (Nest innovation champion training notes, 2019) 
Creative confidence 
(Flexible DTI tool 
deployment) 
“[The sprints] sort of gave us a sandbox to play in. So, during the sprints we just forged ahead and we took the decision that whatever it took to get the 
outcome is what we would do []; that would mean taking a lighter [DT] approach.” (Innovation lead 1, 2019) 
“with the business projects, because you are working with business and you are delivering something for them and a lot of it is incremental, we are a 
little bit more flexible around the process; [] when it’s our mission and it’s explore, we will follow the process from start to finish, but with the 
business projects, [] what part of the process we start applying design thinking to is different.” (Innovation lead 3, 2019). 
“You can also use [Nest] in your business roles at [Urban]: This type of thinking can be applied to lots of different customer problems where you need 
a creative solution; And on business projects you can either use the entire [Nest] process or just use parts of it; So, be flexible and open to those 
opportunities where you can add value to business projects.” (Nest innovation champion training notes, 2019) 
Collective 
sensemaking 
“[W]hat we totally changed in the last sprint – we spent so much time workshopping [] with every range of stakeholders – [TMT], board, everyone, we 
crossed off things, we added things on, we honed again, we honed again, none of that work was done with our prior ideas.” (Nest director, 2019) 
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Key constructs Example quotes 
“We are going to be more regularly touching base with the delegation [TMT representatives] in a much more ad hoc way and bringing them on our 
journey of how we work []. So that the support is there right from the beginning and they come all the way through that process with us.” (Innovation 
lead 1, 2019). 
“So, we will set that mission, that explore mission with the entire executive leadership team, so the head of [all BUs] will all be involved. They will 
know what the mission is. They will have view, visibility into that mission.” (Innovation lead 1, 2019). 
“Key learning was in the past we hadn’t involved the senior people in [Urban] in helping make that decision [on innovations]; so we [] spent a solid 
week every day, one person at a time or two people at a time [] – bringing everyone on this journey. [] The senior exec, we invited the Board and then 
just other key people [], so a lot of that [middle management] level and then some of [them] brought some of their teams as well, so there was probably 
a good 50 or 60 people that we kind of got through that information.” (Nest director, 2019) 
“We set up a room downstairs for ideation; opened it up to the [Bus] - sent out an email saying, ‘we’re doing ideation from this whole day, in this 
room’. And we had so many people come and get involved. I think in total we had about 120 ideas that were developed.” (Nest director, 2019) 
Ambidextrous 
innovation frame 
“it’s hard [to work on explorative and exploitative projects at the same time]. [] we’ve got to balance the two; we have to do business projects, that’s 
how we build relationships, that’s how we learn about the business. [] the hardest thing to do is radical innovation.” (Innovation lead 3, 2019) 
“the project I worked on just recently, there was a fairly radical idea that came [from a BU] and it’s on the radar but they want to focus on some of the 
things that they can do within the next year, but they’re aware that they need to look at more radical things as well.” (Innovation lead 3, 2019) 
“We are going to try to push them [the BUs] towards more radical [projects when working with Nest] because there are so many people trained on the 
[Nest] process now that we are starting to feel like, ‘you could probably do incremental [projects] yourself, but if we’re going to devote resources to 
this from our team and you’re going to put resources on it, pick something meaty.” (Innovation lead 1, 2019) 
“[Nest] vision – To build ambidexterity, embed innovation capability and create value for [Urban].” (Nest innovation champion training notes, 2019) 
Building legitimacy 
for DTI at TMT and 
MM levels 
“So, [we are] talking to all of TMT and all of their direct reports, to understand, what success looks like? What are their biggest problems at the 
moment? [] what’s top of mind for them. How can [Nest] help. What do they need from us? [] where should innovation go next and to try to 
understand their jobs to be done to formulate the strategy for next year.” (Nest director, 2019) 
“[N]ow everyone uses the innovation techniques, terminology []. They know the process we go through; they know how important it is to go and do 
the scans, to use the methodology.” (BU manager 2, 2018). 
 “It’s not unusual for me to go into a meeting and the people in there may not even know exactly what my function is, that I’m from [Nest] and they’ll 
be talking about jobs to be done or customer pain points and that’s just become the norm.” (Innovation lead 3, 2019) 
“the methodology part of the culture– [] I was in the leadership team meeting and they were talking about understanding our customers and this is 
always how people now think; that you have to actually go out and do the research and scan [] everyone speaks a common language in relation to it. 






Table 5: Innovation project examples and indicators in each phase 
Innovation project type and 
indicators 
Phase 1 




2019-2020 (end of data collection) 
Explorative innovation projects* 
e.g., introducing new generation 
of products; enter new technology 
fields; developing innovative 
building methods; focusing on the 
needs of future 
customers 
• Creating a digital platform that 
uses AI algorithms to match 
employees and employers based 
on skills, experience, behaviors 
and ways of working. (-) 
• Converting under-utilized spaces 
(car parks, basements and vacant 
retail or office spaces) into urban 
farms to address the potential 
obsolescence of car parks due to 
the rise of autonomous vehicles (-) 
• no new explore ideas were pursued during 
this phase 
• Utilizing AI to innovate building 
construction methods and to increase 
security on building sites; Urban 
launched a spin-off company (+) 
• Developing more affordable and 
flexible home products for younger 
first home buyers. Launched a spin-
off company (+) 
Exploitative innovation projects 
e.g., reducing costs through 
process efficiency; improving 
existing products and services; 
focusing on existing customers 
• Developing a service that adds 
value to families with children in 
shopping centers (+) 
• Developing prefabricated modules for 
housing construction (+) 
• Creating a work model for co-locating 
employees from different units to work on 
joint projects (+) 
• Developing a Click & Collect service for 
customers of shopping centers (+) 
• Developing a Care & Support service for 
pet owners who live in apartment blocks (-) 
• Developing a transport service to attract 
more visitors to retail centers (-) 
• Creating an opt-in Smart Energy 
System for apartment buyers to access 
solar energy (+) 
• Developing new service features in 
office buildings to improve the tenant 
experience (+) 
• Improving spaces for collaboration, 
wayfinding and traffic flow in office 
buildings (+) 
Number of explorative innovation 
projects  4 (initiated but aborted) 0 2 (completed) 
Number of exploitative 
innovation projects  1 (completed) 44 (completed) 18 (completed) 
Number of Innovation champions 
trained 22 60 83 
Number of full time Nest team 
members (Director and 
innovation leads) 
5 4 4 
* The example explore innovations were initiated in the stated phase but implemented during the following phase given their longer incubation times. (+) innovation 
project was successfully completed/launch of spin-off or start-up; (-) innovation project was discontinued after pilot 
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First-order codes Second-order codes Aggregate dimensions
Statements about Nest’s “separation from the hierarchy”, 
“autonomy”, “independence”; about innovation champions 
working either on explorative or exploitative missions/ideas
Structural separation
Structural separation (Phase 1)
Formal structuring of separate unit separating innovation from 
operational activities, and explorative and exploitative teams
Statements about “core team of people”, “fulltime team of 
people”, “dedicated full-time innovation team” 
Structural separation (Phase 2)
Formal structuring of core innovation team recruitment & training; 
further separation of innovation & operations, exploration & 
exploitation 
Statements about Nest team “providing facilitation, guidance” 
to BU teams, BU focus on “incremental”, Nest focus on 
“explorative ideas”
Structural separation (Phase 3)
Further distinction of task and role divisions across units; BUs focus 
on exploitative versus Nest focus on explorative innovation 
Statements about training a team of “innovation champions”, 
“embedded front-line”, “building capability”
Building DT resources
Building DT resources (Phase 1)
Building the team and capability for DT implementation 
Statements about “increased the internal capability”, “enabled 
progression”, “dedicated innovation resource” 
Building DT resources (Phase 2)
Strengthening the team and capability to progress DTI projects
Statements about “training anyone”, “share methodology with 
colleagues”, everyone is a “champion”
Building DT resources (Phase 3)
Further expanding DTI capabilities across all levels
Statements about “listening to the customer”, being 
“customer-led”, “customer scan”, “ideation” Creative problem solving (Phase 1)
Focus on ‘need-finding’: deploying the DT toolkit intensively to 
develop exploitative and explorative innovation ideas
Statements about running “experiments”, following a “lean 
start-up” approach, “rapid prototyping”, “sprints”, “sandbox” Sprint execution (Phase 2)
Focus on ‘brainstorming’ and ‘prototyping’ solutions: deploying the 
DT toolkit flexibly and selectively to speed up exploitative innovationStatements about “quicker ways to test”, a “lite DT version”, 
use “parts of the process”
Creative confidence (Phase 3)
Focus on ‘need-finding’, ‘brainstorming’, and ‘prototyping’ solutions: 
DT used intensively on explorative projects and selectively on 
exploitative projectsStatements about being more “flexible” and “open” with the 
DT process when working with BUs
Statements about “rigorous DT process”, following the full “DT 
process”
Statements about BUs doing “scans, ideation, experimenting”, 
a shared focus on “understanding the customer”, comfortable 
with DT, “recognizing” the DT tools/process
DT practice deployed
Statements about spending “so much time workshopping with 
stakeholders”, bringing everyone “on a journey”, so many 
people “getting involved”
Frame flexibility (Phase 1)
Frontline project members’ expanding cognitive frames to 
accommodate explorative innovations 
Statements about “adding value to the business”, “consult 
Nest”, “get that outcome for the business”
Co-optation (Phase 2)
Leverage the already legitimized exploitative frame to obtain buy-in 
by bringing visible success at the BU level 
Collective sense-making (Phase 3)
Intense involvement of multiple stakeholders in exploitative and 
explorative initiatives to develop joint interpretations of innovation 
Statements about “innovative thinking”, “think outside the 
box”, “question assumptions”
Generative mechanisms
Statements about “not here to tinker on the edges”, “radically 
revolutionize”, “thinking about what’s beyond” 
Explorative innovation frame (Phase 1)
Focus on explorative innovation, not just exploitation
Statements about innovation needs to be “connected to the 
business”, “incremental change”
Exploitative innovation frame (Phase 2)
Focus on BU-specific, exploitative innovation
Statements about “balancing” exploration and exploitation, 
push more “radical innovation projects in the BUs” 
Ambidextrous innovation frame (Phase 3)
Shared commitment to ambidextrous innovation; synergy between 
exploitative and explorative innovation
Cognitive integration of innovation 
frames
Statements about employees being “aware”, “applying 
innovation as a practice”, DT “spread its way”, “added to the 
lexicon”
Building DT legitimacy
Building DT legitimacy (Phase 1)
Frontline employees recognizing the value of DT for fostering 
innovation
Statements about building “a lot of political capital”, “articulate 
alignment to strategy”, manager “training”, 
“recognition”, “become more embedded” 
Building DT legitimacy (Phase 2)
DT applied increasingly at BU level; BU managers recognizing the 
value of DT tools
Statements about talking to all of “TMT and their direct 
reports”, “everyone uses innovation methodology”, DT 
becoming “the norm”
Building DT legitimacy (Phase 3)
Collective buy-in for DTI across the TMT, MM, and frontline 
employee levels
Statements about “we know our business better”, “not 
achieving anything”, “is there progress”
Inertia/overcoming inertia
Inertia (Phase 1)
BUs scepticism about the value of explorative innovation with no 
immediate impact on the business
Statements about Nest “not going in the right direction”, 
explorative innovation seen as “too slow”
Inertia (Phase 2)
BUs scepticism about the value of pursuing non BU aligned 
explorative innovation
Statements about DT being “an amazing tool for everything”, 
Nest driving a “different mindset in the organization”
Overcoming inertia (Phase 3)




Figure 2: Framework: DT practices for ambidextrous innovation 
 
